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MANILA NEWS DAILY

August 9, 2026 (Sunday) Edition
Philippine News

Severe Thunderstorms Hit Metro Manila, Flood Warning Issued

MANILA, August 8 — Metro Manila was hit by heavy rain and thunderstorms accompanied by strong winds on the 8th. The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) issued a “Red Warning” — its highest rainfall alert level — for the metro area at 8 p.m.

The severe weather was caused by an intensified southwest monsoon (habagat) affecting Luzon and the Visayas. Rain and thunderstorms may continue in Manila tonight, and residents in low-lying and riverside areas need to remain on high alert for serious flooding, flooded roads, and flash floods.

According to PAGASA, there is currently no active tropical cyclone within the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR), and no Tropical Cyclone Wind Signal (TCWS No. 1–5) has been raised over Metro Manila. The strong winds are believed to stem not from a directly approaching typhoon, but from the intensified habagat and well-developed thunderclouds.

It is important for residents to avoid unnecessary travel and not to walk or drive through flooded roads. Those living in low-lying or riverside areas should check their local government’s evacuation advisories and be prepared to move to upper floors or higher, safer ground if necessary.

Because conditions could change suddenly overnight and into tomorrow morning, residents should continue to check the latest updates from PAGASA and their local governments.

Sources: PAGASA — Metro Manila Weather Information / PAGASA — Tropical Cyclone Bulletin

Japan-Philippines Relations

The Full Story of the ‘Luffy Group’ Case — A Violent Crime Ring That Exploited the Philippines as Its Base

The ‘Luffy Case’

The “Luffy case” was not simply a string of robberies. It was a cross-border organized crime operation in which a Japanese criminal group based in the Philippines remotely directed operatives recruited through social media inside Japan, repurposing infrastructure built for telephone fraud into armed robbery. The men identified as the ring’s leaders continued to issue orders — using mobile phones smuggled into a Philippine immigration detention facility — to young men in Japan whom they had never met. In January 2023, a 90-year-old woman was killed in Komae, Tokyo, and the brutality of the crime shook Japanese society.

This article traces how the case arose, how the Philippines came to be exploited as a criminal base, the structure of crimes carried out through so-called “yami baito” (underground part-time jobs), the deportation of suspects through cooperation between the Japanese and Philippine governments, and the state of the trials as of August 7, 2026.


Who Was ‘Luffy’?

“Luffy” was an anonymous account name borrowed from the protagonist of a popular manga, and it did not necessarily refer to a single fixed individual from the outset. Investigators found that the ring’s leaders used multiple aliases, including “Luffy,” “Kim,” and “Mitsuhashi.”

The four men later deported to Japan as the core of the case were Yuki Watanabe, Toma Imamura, Seiya Fujita, and Tomonobu Kojima. According to reporting and the charges filed against them, the group divided roles among overall coordination, planning, recruiting operatives, and collecting cash. It is more accurate to understand the case as a criminal network centered on anonymous leaders, rather than a single person named “Luffy” acting alone.

Origins: A Telephone Fraud Operation Based in the Philippines

The foundation of the case was a large-scale telephone fraud operation (“tokushu sagi”) that targeted elderly people in Japan. According to Japan’s National Police Agency, the fraud linked to this group is believed to have caused over ¥6 billion in damages. The confirmed period ran mainly from November 2018 to June 2020, during which roughly 70 people were reportedly arrested.

In November 2019, Philippine authorities raided a base in Makati City and detained 36 Japanese nationals. There, so-called “kakeko” — callers who phoned Japan to defraud victims of money — had been operating systematically. Most members were sequentially deported to Japan, but the four men later charged as the leaders behind the wide-area robberies remained in the Philippines, tied up in local criminal proceedings.

The raid did not eliminate the criminal organization entirely. The chain of command, the mechanisms for collecting funds, and the recruitment structure remained intact, and part of it was later repurposed from telephone fraud into robbery.

When a Detention Facility Became a ‘Command Center’

The four men were held at a Philippine Bureau of Immigration detention facility in the Bicutan area of Taguig City — a facility meant to hold foreign nationals while deportation and other procedures are processed. At the time, however, the facility reportedly could not fully prevent detainees from using mobile phones or bringing in other items, and corruption and management failures were also pointed out.

The leaders are said to have exploited this environment. Using the encrypted messaging app Telegram, they relayed targets, routes, methods of entry, and role assignments to operatives inside Japan. Because they themselves were outside the country — and in detention — the structure made it difficult to trace back to the leaders even when operatives in Japan were arrested.

In addition, foreign nationals facing unresolved criminal cases in the Philippines can sometimes not be deported until those proceedings conclude. This loophole gave rise to a tactic known as “demanda me,” in which suspects filed lawsuits against themselves to delay deportation. The Philippine Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration later strengthened measures against this abuse of the system.

Responsibility should not be misattributed here, however. It was a criminal group centered on Japanese nationals that planned the crimes and targeted Japanese victims. Philippine society as a whole did not participate in the crimes; rather, certain institutional weaknesses, lapses in facility management, and the presence of corrupt collaborators were exploited by the criminals. Philippine authorities ultimately cooperated with Japan and deported the four key figures.

‘Underground Part-Time Jobs’ Created Disposable Foot Soldiers

Most of the operatives were not longstanding associates with close ties to the ring’s leaders. Young people who responded to social media recruitment posts promising “high pay,” “same-day cash,” and “easy work” were gathered under anonymous handlers.

Applicants were made to submit personal information such as their driver’s license, photographs, family composition, and home address. If they realized partway through that the work was criminal and tried to withdraw, they were threatened with harm to their families or visits to their homes. In this way, operatives — who often did not know each other’s identities or the real names of their handlers — were assigned narrowly divided roles: driving, lookout duty, forced entry, assault, and carrying away stolen goods.

This differs from a traditional organized-crime group with a fixed membership. The core figures stay hidden, recruit people through social media for each crime, and swap out the lower-level participants. This is the form of crime that police now call an “anonymous, fluid criminal group,” or “tokuryu” — and the Luffy case cemented that term in the public consciousness.

Being threatened does not erase the criminal responsibility of those who broke into homes, restrained victims, beat them, and stole property. Courts have handed down lengthy prison terms and life sentences to operatives as well. “Yami baito” is not a part-time job — from the moment someone applies, a criminal organization gains hold of their personal information, and it becomes an entry point that destroys the lives of both victims and perpetrators.

From Fraud to Wide-Area Robbery

The string of robberies occurred between May 2022 and January 2023 across locations including Kyoto, Tokyo, Chiba, Yamaguchi, and Hiroshima. The targets were homes and businesses believed to hold cash, luxury watches, and other valuables.

Ahead of each crime, so-called “apo-den” calls — phone calls used to probe a target’s assets and when they would be home — were made. It appears that the same methods built up through telephone fraud — victim lists, information gathered by phone, division of roles, and remote management of personnel — were transplanted into more directly violent crimes.

The major incidents included:

  • May 2022, Kyoto City: A jewelry store was robbed of numerous luxury watches.
  • October 2022, Inagi, Tokyo: Men posing as delivery workers broke into a home, assaulted the residents, and stole cash and jewelry.
  • November 2022, Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture: An attempted robbery of a home failed.
  • December 2022, Nakano, Tokyo: Intruders broke into a home, injured the residents, and stole cash.
  • January 2023, Oamishirasato, Chiba Prefecture: The owner of a recycling shop was severely beaten and seriously injured.
  • January 2023, Komae, Tokyo: A 90-year-old woman was assaulted and died.

Because the number of cases handled in investigations and trials, and the scope of each defendant’s involvement, differ, it is not appropriate to reduce the “Luffy case” to a single number of incidents. What matters is that incidents across multiple prefectures were connected by the same remotely directed criminal network.

A Life Taken in Komae

What made the brutality of the case unmistakable was the robbery-homicide in Komae, Tokyo, on January 19, 2023. A 90-year-old woman was restrained with cable ties in her own home, beaten severely with a crowbar and other implements, and killed. Luxury watches, rings, and other valuables were stolen.

Police traced the address in Komae from a mobile phone seized during the investigation into an earlier robbery in Oamishirasato, Chiba Prefecture. By the time officers reached the victim’s home, she had already died.

A remote handler, operatives recruited through social media, leaked and gathered personal information, and highly secure communication tools combined to turn a plan to steal valuables into a crime that took the life of an ordinary citizen.

Deportation Pursued by the Japanese and Philippine Governments

Following the Komae case, reports widely suggested that the ring’s leaders were likely detained at a Philippine immigration facility. The Japanese government requested the prompt deportation of the four men, and the Philippine Department of Justice and Bureau of Immigration moved quickly to resolve the pending local cases and process their deportation.

On February 7, 2023, Toma Imamura and Seiya Fujita were deported to Japan. Yuki Watanabe and Tomonobu Kojima followed by February 9, and both were arrested by Japanese police, including while still in transit. All four were initially arrested on charges related to telephone fraud, such as theft, and were subsequently charged, one by one, in connection with robberies across the country.

This deportation was made possible through investigative and judicial cooperation between Japan and the Philippines. While the case exposed gaps in the Philippines’ facility management, it is also an example of the two countries’ authorities correcting the abuse of the system and handing the suspects over to Japan’s criminal justice system.

How Far Has the Trial Progressed?

As of August 7, 2026, guilty verdicts have continued to be handed down against operatives and intermediaries. One of the operatives involved in the Komae case, among others, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Among the alleged leaders, the Tokyo District Court sentenced Seiya Fujita to life imprisonment on February 16, 2026, finding that he had played an “essential role” in seven cases, including the robbery-homicide in Komae. In the case of Tomonobu Kojima, a 20-year prison sentence handed down over his involvement in telephone fraud, recruitment of operatives, and the robberies was finalized in August 2026 after the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal.

Meanwhile, Yuki Watanabe and Toma Imamura have been indicted on charges including robbery resulting in death, but no final judicial determination had been reached as of this writing. Under criminal law, a defendant is presumed innocent until a verdict becomes final, and reporting must distinguish between the assessments of investigators and facts established by a court.

Keeping the Philippines From Becoming a ‘Haven for Criminals’

Even after the Luffy case, the Philippine Bureau of Immigration has continued to arrest and deport members of the “Luffy” group and figures associated with a group known as “JP Dragon” who are wanted in Japan. The Bureau has repeatedly stated its position that it will not allow the Philippines to become a hiding place for foreign fugitives.

What is needed is not to condemn any nationality or country. It is to squarely confront the reality that criminals exploit combinations of national borders, communication technology, immigration systems, and the limits of investigative authority — and to strengthen information-sharing between Japan and the Philippines, the swift arrest and deportation of fugitives, communication controls at detention facilities, and anti-corruption measures.

Within Japan as well, efforts must proceed in parallel: removing “yami baito” recruitment posts, lawfully investigating highly secure communication tools, tracing criminal proceeds, preventing the leaking of victim lists, and raising awareness among young people. Arresting only the low-level operatives is not enough — as long as the anonymous core figures and the flow of money remain, the same crime can be reborn under a different name.

Lessons Left by the Case

The essence of the Luffy case does not lie merely in the unusual fact that four Japanese men were detained in the Philippines. It lies in how criminal infrastructure built for telephone fraud transformed — through social media and anonymous communication — into more violent armed robbery.

The leaders issued orders from abroad, the operatives were treated as disposable, and the victims lost not only their assets but, in one case, their life. This case shattered the conventional assumptions that crossing a border puts one beyond the reach of investigators, that detention halts criminal activity, and that arresting the lower ranks stops the organization.

At the same time, the unraveling of the case and the deportations were achieved through cooperation between Japan and the Philippines. The Philippines was not the cause of the case but a place exploited by a Japanese criminal group — and it subsequently worked alongside Japan to dismantle the criminal network. Keeping this distinction in view, and strengthening institutions and investigative cooperation against cross-border crime, is the starting point for preventing a repeat of this case.


Timeline

  • November 2018 onward: Telephone fraud operations based in the Philippines expand
  • November 2019: 36 Japanese nationals detained in Makati City
  • May 2022 – January 2023: A series of robberies and attempted robberies occur across Japan
  • January 19, 2023: A 90-year-old woman dies in Komae, Tokyo
  • February 7–9, 2023: The four alleged leaders are deported from the Philippines to Japan
  • 2024: Japan’s police white paper features measures against anonymous, fluid criminal groups
  • February 16, 2026: Tokyo District Court sentences Seiya Fujita to life imprisonment
  • August 2026: Tomonobu Kojima’s 20-year sentence becomes final

References

  1. National Police Agency, “White Paper on Police 2024” — “Police Measures Against Anonymous, Fluid Criminal Groups”
    https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/r06/honbun/index.html
  2. Ministry of Justice, “White Paper on Crime 2024,” Part 4, Chapter 3, Section 2
    https://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/71/nfm/n71_2_4_3_2_1.html
  3. Philippine Department of Justice, “DOJ helps BI tackle the ‘Demanda Me’ scheme” (October 17, 2023)
    https://www.doj.gov.ph/news_article.html?newsid=adgUUTAXPiOLdpXuGv2Oxgu76wQ0bQn2EHlbWU5DyG0
  4. Philippine Bureau of Immigration, “BI successfully deports two Japanese members of ‘Luffy’ Gang”
    https://immigration.gov.ph/bi-successful-deports-two-japanese-members-of-luffy-gang/
  5. Philippine Bureau of Immigration, “BI deports another ‘Luffy’ gang member to Japan”
    https://immigration.gov.ph/bi-deports-another-luffy-gang-member-to-japan/
  6. Mainichi Shimbun, “‘Luffy’? Suspect group’s telephone fraud damages exceed ¥6 billion: National Police Agency” (February 2, 2023)
    https://mainichi.jp/articles/20230202/k00/00m/040/086000c
  7. Ryukyu Shimpo, “‘Luffy’ ringleader sentenced to life imprisonment: Tokyo District Court” (February 17, 2026)
    https://ryukyushimpo.jp/national/entry-5042291.html
  8. Tokyo Hodo Shimbun, “‘Luffy’ Wide-Area Robbery Case: Tomonobu Kojima’s 20-Year Prison Sentence Finalized by Supreme Court” (August 5, 2026)
    https://tokyonewsmedia.com/archives/26173

Editor’s note: This article was compiled based on government materials, investigative announcements, news reporting, and trial information published as of August 7, 2026. Descriptions of the defendants, except where a final verdict has been reached, reflect the charges filed or the claims of investigative authorities; defendants are presumed innocent until a guilty verdict becomes final.

Other

In the 1980s, Filipino (Tagalog) Novels Barely Existed — Today They’re a Market of Tens of Thousands

Forty years ago, during the Marcos era, Tagalog and Filipino-language novels were so marginal that they weren’t even tracked in commercial statistics. Since then, through a historic boom in mass-market paperbacks and, more recently, a wave of web novels turned into published books riding on digital platforms, they have transformed into one of the pillars supporting the Philippines’ domestic publishing and creative industries today.

Let’s look at five writers who represent contemporary Filipino literature and popular fiction, along with their best-known works. Their pen names are a parade of mysterious English phrases, but since I have a soft spot for historical fiction, I’d love to read UndeniablyGorgeous’s time-leap fantasy “I Love You Since 1892” (which was even adapted into a TV series) in Japanese. As it happens, 1892 is the year my much-admired José Rizal founded the peaceful reform organization La Liga Filipina — and the year he was arrested by the Spanish authorities and exiled to Dapitan on Mindanao.

1. Jonaxx

  • Style: The reigning queen of contemporary romance fiction, commanding an overwhelming, almost cult-like following in Philippine youth culture.
  • Best-known work: Heartless
  • Notable for: She first rose to fame on the online platform Wattpad, gathering millions of followers. Hugely popular among university students and young readers generally, her work — later published commercially — has become an emblem of the pop culture consumed by today’s Filipino youth.

2. HaveYouSeenThisGirL

  • Style: A young writer who helped ignite the digitally born light-novel romance boom.
  • Best-known work: Diary ng Panget (Diary of an Ugly Girl)
  • Notable for: Posted online while she was still a teenager, this novel — written in the mixed Tagalog-English youth slang known as “Taglish” — became a runaway bestseller and was later made into a film. Rather than an intellectual crowd, it was ordinary young readers, seeing themselves reflected in the story, who drove its success.

3. UndeniablyGorgeous

  • Style: A popular writer skilled at blending historical romance, time-leap plots, and fantasy elements.
  • Best-known work: I Love You Since 1892
  • Notable for: A historical romance in which a modern-day woman time-travels to the Philippines under Spanish rule at the end of the 19th century. Rather than simple sweet romance, it weaves in the historical backdrop of the era and the beauty of Filipino culture and language, and is widely credited with sparking younger readers’ interest in history.

4. Mina V. Esguerra

  • Style: A leading figure in contemporary Philippine romance fiction, publishing high-quality romantic comedies and socially engaged romance novels in both English and Tagalog.
  • Best-known work: Never Just Friends
  • Notable for: While she herself belongs to an educated, professional milieu — teaching writing at the university level, among other things — her stories depict the real-life romances, careers, and daily lives of young professionals working in present-day Manila with a light touch, earning her a broad readership both in the Philippines and abroad.

5. Bob Ong

  • Style: An enigmatic, nationally beloved bestselling author who cannot be left out of any discussion of contemporary Philippine popular literature.
  • Best-known work: ABNKKBSNPLAko?! (a slang-based title roughly meaning “Am I Still Learning My ABCs?!”)
  • Notable for: With his real name and background never disclosed, exactly who he is remains unknown, but he has produced one national bestseller after another by depicting the everyday school life and social realities of ordinary Filipinos not through highbrow literary language, but through street-level Tagalog humor that anyone can relate to. He is credited with completely tearing down the sense that Philippine popular literature was something reserved for the highly educated.

Does Bangsamoro Have Its Own Police, Military, or Currency? — Where Authority Over Land and Currency Sits with the Central Government (Part 2 of 4)

Does Bangsamoro Have Its Own Police or Military? — Where Authority Over Land and Currency Sits with the Central Government

In the previous installment, we looked at how the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) holds greater legislative and fiscal powers than an ordinary Philippine local government, including a mechanism under which it receives an annual block grant from the central government in addition to its share of national taxes collected within the region.

Does BARMM, then, have its own police force or military?

And does all state-owned land within BARMM automatically become the property of the BARMM government? Does the Philippine land registration system still apply as-is? Is the Malaysian ringgit, used in Tawi-Tawi Province, a second official currency of BARMM?

The short answer: BARMM has no autonomous police force, military, or currency of its own.

Institutions closely tied to national sovereignty — policing, the armed forces, land registration, and currency issuance — remain under the fundamental control of the Philippine central government.

That said, the BARMM government is granted a greater degree of involvement than an ordinary local government in matters such as consultation with regional police, land use, natural resources, and the rights of indigenous peoples.

BARMM Has No Independent Police Force

BARMM has no police force that the autonomous government itself recruits or commands.

Policing within the region falls under the Philippine National Police (PNP), a national organization. Within BARMM, policing is handled by the Police Regional Office Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, commonly known as PRO BAR.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law explicitly places PRO BAR under the direct operational control and supervision of the PNP.

The BARMM Chief Minister therefore does not have the authority to:

  • Recruit police officers independently
  • Establish a separate police rank system
  • Organize an armed police force separate from the PNP
  • Directly order investigations or arrests
  • Unilaterally appoint or dismiss the regional police director
  • Establish firearms or arrest procedures that differ from PNP national rules

The BARMM Regional Police Director is appointed in accordance with national law, following consultation with the Chief Minister.

The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) also maintains a regional office in BARMM, which investigates complaints against regional police, among other functions. However, this regional office likewise remains under the direct control of the national NAPOLCOM.

In other words, the BARMM Chief Minister can speak on regional security matters and take part in consultations, but is not the supreme commander of the police.

Republic Act No. 11054 — Bangsamoro Organic Law

Can Former MILF and MNLF Members Join the Police?

The Bangsamoro Organic Law includes special provisions allowing former members of the MILF and MNLF to join the PNP.

For a limited period, NAPOLCOM may relax recruitment requirements for:

  • Age
  • Height
  • Educational attainment

This does not, however, create a system under which the MILF or MNLF maintains its own police force.

Those recruited become PNP officers and are subject to the same nationwide training, ranks, discipline, and chain of command as any other officer. They are not permitted to take orders from their former organization or former commanders.

No separate “Bangsamoro police force” made up exclusively of former MILF/MNLF members has been created — this is a transitional measure to integrate former combatants into the lawful national police system.

The BARMM Government Has No Military

The BARMM government has no military of its own.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law explicitly states that national defense and security in BARMM remain the responsibility of the Philippine central government.

All forces stationed within BARMM therefore belong to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the:

  • Philippine Army
  • Philippine Navy
  • Philippine Marine Corps
  • Philippine Air Force

Neither the BARMM Chief Minister nor the Bangsamoro Parliament can directly command these forces.

The BARMM government does not have the authority to:

  • Organize its own military
  • Recruit military personnel
  • Order military operations
  • Independently manage AFP bases
  • Enter into its own military agreements with foreign forces
  • Purchase weapons using the block grant

In fact, the Bangsamoro Organic Law explicitly prohibits using the annual block grant to purchase firearms, ammunition, weapons, or explosives.

How Many Troops Are Stationed in BARMM?

The Armed Forces of the Philippines does not publicly disclose the exact number of troops permanently stationed within BARMM at any given time. The number also fluctuates due to troop movements, operations, and election security deployments.

Based on publicly available unit assignments, the following forces are primarily deployed in BARMM:

  • Two Maguindanao provinces, Cotabato City, and the Special Geographic Area: units under the Army’s 6th Infantry Division
  • Lanao del Sur Province, Marawi City: Army 103rd Infantry Brigade
  • Basilan Province: Army infantry brigade and special forces units
  • Tawi-Tawi Province: Marine 2nd Marine Brigade, Naval task force
  • Northern Maguindanao, around Cotabato City: units under the Marine 1st Marine Brigade

Based on these unit assignments, it is estimated that, under normal circumstances, BARMM hosts approximately:

  • 5 to 6 major brigades
  • The equivalent of roughly 18 to 22 combat battalions
  • A total of roughly 10,000 to 14,000 personnel

may be deployed within the region.

This figure, however, is only a rough estimate based on publicly disclosed unit assignments, not an official troop count released by the military.

Ahead of the BARMM parliamentary election in September 2026, additional units — including the 28th Infantry Battalion, 75th Infantry Battalion, and 2nd Scout Ranger Battalion — have been deployed as reinforcements. The reinforcement is estimated at around 1,500 personnel, and troop levels are expected to be higher than usual during the election period.

Report on troop reinforcements for the 2026 BARMM election

Note that Sulu Province was excluded from BARMM by a 2024 Supreme Court ruling. As a result, the main body of the 11th Infantry Division, whose primary jurisdiction covers Sulu, is not included in the BARMM troop estimate above.

Will the Military Eventually Withdraw from BARMM?

The peace agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government includes the idea of gradually redeploying military forces away from conflict areas as the security situation normalizes.

This does not, however, mean the military will completely withdraw from all of BARMM.

The Philippine central government continues to bear responsibility for:

  • National defense
  • Counterterrorism
  • Responding to armed groups
  • Border and maritime security
  • Responding to large-scale security crises
  • Disaster relief

If MILF disarmament progresses and threats from groups such as the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf diminish, the deployment of frontline-type units may be scaled back or reorganized. However, the military itself — as the guarantor of national sovereignty — will not disappear from BARMM.

The Philippine Land Registration System Applies As-Is

The nationwide Torrens land registration system applies in BARMM just as it does throughout the Philippines.

The following therefore remain, in principle, governed by national law:

  • Registration of land ownership
  • Transfer Certificate of Title
  • Original Certificate of Title
  • The Registry of Deeds
  • The Land Registration Authority
  • Changes of ownership through sale or inheritance
  • Registration of mortgages and other liens
  • Court determination of ownership

The BARMM government cannot issue its own land titles to replace the nationwide Torrens registration system.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law also explicitly states that land titles issued by the central government under the Torrens system may not be invalidated.

Private land that was lawfully acquired and registered before BARMM’s establishment is therefore not automatically confiscated or invalidated simply because the autonomous government was established.

Not All Land Within BARMM Belongs to the BARMM Government

Simply being located within BARMM does not mean land automatically belongs to the BARMM government.

Land must be divided into at least the following categories:

  • Registered private land: the registered owner
  • Philippine state land: the Republic of the Philippines
  • BARMM government-owned land: the BARMM government
  • Land owned by provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays: the respective local government unit
  • Ancestral domain: indigenous peoples or communities with recognized rights
  • Forests, mining areas, protected areas: the state or the relevant legal authority

Under the Philippine Constitution, public land and natural resources belong, in principle, to the state.

The BARMM government has been granted significant authority over matters such as agricultural land leasing, forest management, land use, and environmental conservation. This does not mean, however, that ownership of all state land within BARMM has been transferred wholesale to the BARMM government.

Land held by the central government, AFP facilities, and sites belonging to national agencies remain under central government ownership and management unless formally transferred.

Meanwhile, land, buildings, and facilities formally handed over from the former ARMM to the BARMM government do become BARMM government assets.

The Bangsamoro Parliament Can Manage Agricultural Land and Forests

The Bangsamoro Organic Law grants the Bangsamoro Parliament the authority, within the scope of its autonomy, to enact laws regulating:

  • Leasing of agricultural land
  • Land use permits
  • Forest management
  • Nature reserves
  • Watersheds
  • Coastal and marine resources
  • Inland waters

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between different types of rights.

“The authority to issue use permits,” “the authority to manage,” and “the authority to lease” are not the same as “the authority to own the land itself.”

Even where the BARMM government can manage use permits or leases for state-owned agricultural land, underlying ownership may still remain with the Republic of the Philippines.

Ancestral Domain and the Torrens System: A Point of Conflict

One of the factors that complicates BARMM’s land issues is the relationship between ancestral domain and the modern land registration system.

Some Moro and non-Moro indigenous communities have used certain land for generations without holding a formal Torrens title.

In other cases, a Torrens title was issued to a different party through past resettlement policies or land disposition processes.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law recognizes:

  • Indigenous peoples’ native title
  • Customary land tenure
  • Ancestral domain
  • Past unjust loss of land
  • Compensation for communities dispossessed of land

and requires the BARMM government to establish a system of transitional justice and compensation.

At the same time, however, it also states that title deeds already issued by the central government under the Torrens system may not be invalidated.

As a result, rather than unilaterally revoking existing titles, the paths available to the BARMM government include things such as:

  • Compensation
  • Buy-back of land
  • Relocation to alternative land
  • Boundary adjustment
  • Mediation
  • Litigation
  • Shared-use arrangements

Land remains one of the most difficult policy challenges BARMM will continue to face.

BARMM Has No Currency of Its Own

BARMM’s legal tender is the Philippine peso, the same as in every other part of the Philippines.

The BARMM government is not permitted to:

  • Issue its own banknotes
  • Mint its own coins
  • Create a “Bangsamoro dinar”
  • Establish its own central bank
  • Designate a currency other than the peso as legal tender

The Philippine central bank law provides that only the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may issue currency within Philippine territory.

No other entity, public or private, may issue or circulate banknotes, coins, or similar instruments as currency.

Republic Act No. 7653 — The New Central Bank Act

There is also no confirmed historical instance of the former ARMM, BARMM, MNLF, or MILF issuing their own banknotes or coins and circulating them widely as a general means of payment among residents.

The Malaysian Ringgit Is Also Used in Tawi-Tawi

While the peso remains the legal tender, the Malaysian ringgit is sometimes used in actual commercial transactions in southern Tawi-Tawi Province.

This is particularly true in areas such as:

  • The Turtle Islands
  • Sitangkai
  • Sibutu
  • Coastal areas that trade with Sabah

where both pesos and ringgit may be accepted.

The reason lies not in political autonomy but in geography and economics.

  • Closer to Sabah than to Manila or Cebu
  • Some food, fuel, and daily necessities enter from Sabah
  • Remittances in ringgit from residents or relatives working in Sabah
  • On some islands, banking services and peso cash supply are insufficient
  • Cross-border maritime trade has continued for generations

In this sense, the ringgit functions in some areas as a de facto supplementary or secondary currency.

The ringgit, however, is not legal tender in the Philippines.

Taxes, administrative fees, government salaries, and government budgets are, in principle, calculated and paid in pesos. Shops are also under no legal obligation to accept ringgit.

Cash Is Also Used in “Barter Trade”

Trade between Tawi-Tawi and Sabah is generally referred to as barter trade.

However, not all of today’s barter trade consists of pure exchange of goods for goods.

In practice, actual transactions involve a mix of:

  • Exchange of goods for goods
  • Settlement in pesos
  • Settlement in ringgit
  • Netting by intermediaries
  • Credit sales
  • Deferred payment

It would therefore be inaccurate to assume from the name “barter trade” that cash or foreign currency is never used.

The Boundary Between Autonomy and National Sovereignty

BARMM holds substantial autonomy, but not all government functions have been transferred to it.

  • Regional legislation and regional budget: BARMM government / Bangsamoro Parliament
  • Police: PNP
  • National defense / military: Philippine central government / Armed Forces
  • Land registration: the nationwide Torrens system
  • BARMM-owned land: the BARMM government
  • State land: the Republic of the Philippines, in principle
  • Land use, agricultural leasing, forest management: a degree of autonomy granted to BARMM
  • Currency issuance: BSP
  • Foreign affairs, nationality, immigration: the Philippine central government

BARMM’s autonomy does not mean sovereignty separated from the Philippine state.

It is a system in which the region holds broad policymaking authority over education, health, the economy, culture, land use, and natural resources, while remaining within national institutions for policing, defense, land registration, and currency.

Understanding this boundary is the key both to avoiding the misconception that BARMM is an independent state, and to distinguishing it from an ordinary local government.


Coming Up in Part 3:

Part 3 will look at firearms regulation in BARMM, private security companies, and the private armies maintained by politicians and clans.

Can former MILF/MNLF combatants, political bodyguards, or clan self-defense forces legally hold unregistered firearms? Is it true that security companies are really limited to 500 guards? We sort out the boundary between lawful security organizations and private armies.

*This article is based on laws and government materials confirmable as of August 2026. Military troop numbers are estimates based on publicly disclosed unit assignments, not official figures.

Key References:

Sending Development Experts to the Ceasefire Monitoring Team — J-BIRD and “Unarmed Peacekeeping” (Part 2)

Sending Development Experts to the Ceasefire Monitoring Team — J-BIRD and “Unarmed Peacekeeping”

In 2006, the Japanese government launched J-BIRD (the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development).

That same year, Japan joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which oversees the ceasefire between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

But what Japan sent was not a combat force armed to keep the two sides apart — it was socioeconomic development experts, including JICA personnel.

Japanese experts went into conflict-affected villages to assess the need for schools, health centers, water-supply facilities, and farm roads. They consulted with residents, local governments, the Philippine national government, and the MILF, coordinating so that assistance projects did not favor any single ethnic group, religion, or political faction.

What Japan brought to the IMT was not military force, but “development” as a means of sustaining the ceasefire.

Why Was an International Monitoring Team Needed?

The Philippine government and the MILF resumed peace negotiations in 2001 and agreed to a ceasefire.

But the mere existence of a signed agreement did not guarantee that the ceasefire would actually hold.

In areas where government troops and MILF forces operated close to one another, any shooting incident or dispute involving residents would prompt each side to accuse the other of violating the ceasefire. A small incident risked provoking retaliation and escalating into fighting across the wider region.

There was also the risk that incidents involving the private armies of local politicians, clan feuds, or criminal groups could be mistaken for fighting between government troops and the MILF.

In response, the International Monitoring Team (IMT), led by Malaysia, was established in 2004.

The IMT’s main roles were to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the MILF, investigate incidents suspected of violating it, and maintain communication and trust between the two sides.

Malaysia played the central role, with Brunei, Libya, and Indonesia also participating at various times. From 2006, Japan contributed experts responsible for the socioeconomic development component.

How Did Japan’s Participation in the IMT Differ from a Typical PKO?

The name “International Monitoring Team” might suggest an armed force similar to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (PKO).

But the IMT in Mindanao is not a UN PKO.

It is an international ceasefire-monitoring body established under an agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, with Malaysia in the lead role. Japan’s participation, too, was not a deployment of its Self-Defense Forces.

The experts Japan sent were given diplomatic status by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and worked within the IMT’s socioeconomic development component — a role linking JICA’s development assistance with the Japanese government’s peace diplomacy.

  • Typical military ceasefire monitoring: verifying troop movements — Japan’s socioeconomic development support: assessing residents’ living conditions
  • Typical military ceasefire monitoring: investigating ceasefire violations — Japan’s socioeconomic development support: identifying reconstruction and development needs
  • Typical military ceasefire monitoring: coordinating contact between armed factions — Japan’s socioeconomic development support: connecting the government, the MILF, and residents through aid projects
  • Typical military ceasefire monitoring: deterring a resumption of fighting — Japan’s socioeconomic development support: reducing the underlying causes of a return to fighting
  • Typical military ceasefire monitoring: upholding the ceasefire chiefly from above — Japan’s socioeconomic development support: sustaining peace from the ground up, through residents themselves

Japanese experts had no authority to enforce the ceasefire itself by military means.

Instead, they used the time and space created by the ceasefire to advance regional development. The thinking was that if the ceasefire led to real improvements in residents’ lives, more people would support the peace process, making it harder for armed groups to resume fighting.

What Is J-BIRD?

J-BIRD is not the name of a single project limited to building schools or roads.

It is a comprehensive support framework bringing together multiple projects carried out by the Japanese government and JICA for peace, reconstruction, and development in Mindanao.

Its main objectives can be organized into three points:

  • Reduce poverty in conflict-affected areas
  • Develop basic social services that residents can use
  • Cultivate the human resources who will carry forward future peace and self-governance

In concrete terms, the following kinds of projects were carried out:

  • Building schools and classrooms
  • Developing health centers and clinics
  • Installing wells and water-supply facilities
  • Small-scale infrastructure such as farm roads and bridges
  • Promoting rice farming and agricultural techniques
  • Supporting the processing and sale of agricultural products
  • Training local government officials
  • Supporting community-run project management
  • Socioeconomic surveys of conflict-affected areas

According to JICA, over its many years of support for Mindanao, Japan has carried out approximately 650 small-scale community infrastructure projects and provided training to more than 25,000 people in conflict-affected areas.

Not all of this was accomplished immediately after 2006. It is the cumulative result of more than twenty years of effort following the launch of J-BIRD, carried out in step with progress in the peace negotiations and the establishment of BARMM.

Why Do Small Schools and Wells Help Achieve Peace?

Building schools and wells alone does not resolve an ethnic conflict.

The Bangsamoro conflict has multiple causes: loss of land, political marginalization, religious and cultural conflict, domination by local power brokers, and violence by government forces and armed groups alike.

But if the benefits of the state or of peace never reach residents’ daily lives, their reason to support a peace agreement grows weaker too.

In a village where fighting has destroyed the school, for instance, children cannot get an education. Without a well, women and children must walk long distances to fetch water. Without a farm road, harvested crops cannot be brought to market, and farmers’ incomes cannot grow.

If the government and MILF leadership announce a peace agreement under these conditions, ordinary residents may well see it as having nothing to do with their own lives.

If, on the other hand, schools, health centers, wells, and roads are built after the ceasefire, residents can feel concretely that peace brings real benefits.

This concrete benefit is the “peace dividend.”

Who Received the “Peace Dividend”?

Under J-BIRD, it was important that assistance benefit the entire population of conflict-affected areas — including Christians and indigenous peoples — rather than Muslims alone.

The Mindanao conflict is not simply a war of “Muslims versus Christians.”

Even among Muslims there are differences of ethnicity, clan, and political affiliation. Indigenous peoples have their own distinct land and cultural issues, and there are Christian residents, too, who were displaced by the fighting.

If Japan’s assistance were concentrated only in areas under MILF influence, other residents might well conclude that “only areas that joined the rebel side get help.”

Conversely, if aid went only to areas under Philippine government control, the MILF side might view it as government propaganda.

Japanese experts therefore selected project sites by taking into account each area’s ethnic and religious makeup, the extent of conflict damage, the level of poverty, local government capacity, and residents’ consent.

Carrying out aid fairly and transparently was, in itself, part of building trust.

How Did Japanese Experts Gain Access to the Conflict Zone?

For JICA personnel to operate in an area with unstable security, the Philippine government’s permission alone was not enough.

Moving from an area controlled by government forces into one under MILF influence required coordination and safety guarantees from both sides.

Japanese experts used their standing within the IMT to move between the national army, the MILF, local governments, and local communities.

On the ground, they carried out work such as:

  • Hearing requests from village leaders
  • Assessing the state of schools, clinics, roads, and water supply
  • Investigating the history of fighting and displacement
  • Explaining project details to both the government and MILF sides
  • Confirming whether residents could maintain and manage the facilities
  • Checking, after completion, whether projects were being properly used

Through this work, Japan was able to build relationships not only with the top-level peace negotiators, but with local commanders and ordinary residents as well.

Development projects were, at the same time, both assistance in their own right and a means of creating new channels of communication among the government, the MILF, and local communities.

The 2007–09 Socioeconomic Reconstruction Survey

Between 2007 and 2009, Japan carried out a large-scale survey on the socioeconomic reconstruction and development of conflict-affected areas.

This survey is generally known as SERD-CAAM.

It covered areas affected by fighting between the government and the MILF, surveying population, poverty, agriculture, roads, education, health, and water supply in each locality, and drawing up future reconstruction and development plans.

What matters is that this survey was not conducted by the Philippine government alone.

Japan also worked with the Bangsamoro Development Agency, a development body established by the MILF, using the survey — with an eye toward the post-peace future — as an opportunity for MILF-affiliated personnel to learn about development planning and local administration.

An armed organization may have the capacity to command troops, but it typically has little administrative experience in drafting budgets, planning roads, or delivering public services to residents.

Even before a final peace agreement was reached, Japan had already begun preparing the people and institutions needed for the possibility that the MILF would one day take part in governance.

2008: The Peace Talks Collapse

About two years after J-BIRD began, Japan’s support faced a major crisis.

In 2008, the Philippine government and the MILF were preparing a draft agreement, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which would have defined the extent of the Moro people’s “ancestral domain” and their governing authority over it.

But local politicians and others opposed to the draft agreement filed suit with the Supreme Court, which ruled against allowing it to be signed.

The peace talks effectively collapsed, and fighting flared up again between government forces and some MILF units. Large numbers of residents were displaced, and the international ceasefire-monitoring framework was scaled back as well.

At this point, it would not have been surprising if Japan had concluded that the prospects for peace were gone and withdrawn.

But the Japanese government and JICA did not suspend their support altogether.

Why Didn’t Japan Withdraw?

One reason Japan stayed was that it saw development assistance as being for ordinary residents affected by the conflict, not only for the parties to the peace negotiations.

It is precisely when peace talks fail that displacement, poverty, disrupted education, and damage to agriculture worsen. If aid were withdrawn simply because negotiations had failed, it would be ordinary residents who suffered the most.

Second, Japan believed that even if the peace talks had failed for the moment, the government and the MILF would ultimately return to the negotiating table.

It would be difficult to eliminate the MILF through military force alone, while the MILF, for its part, had no realistic prospect of immediate independence from the Philippines. For both sides, renewed negotiation was ultimately the only path to a solution.

Third, Sadako Ogata, JICA’s president at the time, was strongly determined to continue Japan’s support.

The JICA Ogata Research Institute has assessed that Japan’s decision to continue its assistance in 2008, even as the peace process broke down and other supporting actors scaled back their activities, laid the groundwork for the trust it would later earn.

A country that shows up only when peace is going smoothly and leaves the moment a crisis hits cannot become a long-term mediator.

By staying through the difficult period, Japan demonstrated to both the Philippine government and the MILF that its engagement was not a temporary matter.

Continued Assistance Turned into Diplomatic Trust

After the 2008 collapse of the peace talks, Japan’s development assistance came to mean more than ordinary ODA.

Japanese experts kept up contact with the government, the MILF, local governments, and residents. As a result, even as the formal peace talks stalled, this helped prevent relations between the parties from being severed entirely.

The trust JICA earned through its work on the ground also came to serve the Japanese government’s diplomatic efforts.

Conversely, because the Japanese government provided political backing for the peace negotiations, JICA was able to continue its development projects even in areas with unstable security.

This is a defining feature of Japan’s support for Bangsamoro.

It was not simply a division of labor in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handled peace diplomacy and JICA handled regional development. Diplomacy and development formed a structure that mutually reinforced each other.

Japan’s Peace Support Develops into Three Functions

The Japanese government and JICA went on to develop their subsequent support for Mindanao into a combination of the following three functions:

  • Peacekeeping — the International Monitoring Team (IMT): ceasefire monitoring and socioeconomic development
  • Peacemaking — the International Contact Group (ICG): advising the peace negotiations and building trust between the parties
  • Peacebuilding — J-BIRD: poverty reduction, regional development, and human resource development

Japan’s participation in the IMT and J-BIRD, beginning in 2006, was the first of these stages.

In 2009, Japan joined the International Contact Group, moving into a role of formally supporting the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF.

Then, in 2011, Japanese mediation made possible a historic meeting at Narita between President Benigno Aquino III and MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim.

Japan’s support, which began with local schools and wells, had grown into a diplomatic role connecting the President of the Philippines with the supreme leader of the MILF.

What “Unarmed Peacekeeping” Really Means

Japan’s participation in the IMT cannot be judged by the same standard as military ceasefire monitoring.

Japanese experts had neither the authority to arrest ceasefire violators nor the capacity to stop fighting by force.

Even so, development assistance had a different role to play:

  • Letting residents feel the benefits of peace
  • Reducing disparities in aid between different areas
  • Enabling the government and the MILF to jointly address local problems
  • Developing the people who would go on to run future administration
  • Reducing the reasons young people and former combatants might rejoin armed groups
  • Showing that the international community was watching over the peace process

Armed ceasefire monitoring suppresses the outbreak of fighting.

Peacebuilding through development reduces the political and social causes behind a recurrence of fighting.

The two are not in competition — they complement one another.

Conclusion of Part 2

Japan’s participation in J-BIRD and the IMT was different from ordinary official development assistance.

Rather than waiting to begin reconstruction work until after a peace agreement was reached, Japan entered the conflict zone while the government and the MILF were still maintaining a ceasefire and negotiating.

What Japanese experts did there was not simply build facilities.

They surveyed which areas needed assistance, confirmed fairness across ethnic, religious, and political lines, and built channels of communication and cooperation among the government, the MILF, local governments, and residents.

Even after the peace talks collapsed in 2008, Japan did not withdraw — it continued supporting residents and maintaining relationships. This continuity transformed Japan from a mere donor country into a trusted third party supporting the peace negotiations.

Japan’s “unarmed peacekeeping” is not simply a matter of substituting schools and wells for military force.

It was an effort, carried out through development assistance, to connect the government and the rebel organization, create an environment in which residents could support peace, and reduce the reasons to return to conflict.


Coming in Part 3

Part 3 will examine the process by which Japan moved from being a development-aid donor to becoming a mediator in the peace negotiations.

In 2009, Japan joined the International Contact Group, becoming involved as an official observer in the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF.

Then, in August 2011, Japanese mediation made possible the first-ever summit between President Aquino and MILF chairman Murad, held at Narita.

Why was the meeting held in Japan rather than in Manila or Cotabato? Part 3 will examine how the Narita meeting led to the 2012 Framework Agreement and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

*This article is based on materials from the Japanese government, JICA, the Philippine government, and other sources available as of August 2026.

Main Sources

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