MANILA NEWS DAILY
Major Differences Between Philippine and Japanese Real Estate Law
— Why Double-Selling Is Difficult in the Philippines —
Introduction
Anyone involved in Philippine real estate transactions — condominiums in particular — frequently feels how different the system is from Japan’s land registration system. The Philippine registration system, known as the Torrens System, is built on a fundamentally different concept from Japan’s: the Certificate of Title itself carries extremely strong legal force. This article lays out the features of the Torrens System in contrast with Japan’s registration system, and also discusses the practical operation of foreign ownership restrictions and recent legislative developments.
What Is the Torrens System? — How It Differs from Japan’s “Perfection Requirement” Approach
Japanese real estate registration is legally based on a concept known as the “perfection requirement” (taikō yōken shugi). Registration is merely a means of asserting ownership — already established between the parties — against third parties; even if the register’s contents diverge from the true state of the rights, the state does not guarantee their accuracy (there is no “public faith,” or kōshinryoku). Put in extreme terms, in Japan there remains, in theory, a possibility that a transaction made in reliance on the register could later be overturned by the emergence of the true rights holder.
The Philippine Torrens System, by contrast, is one in which the state guarantees that the registered rights holder is the true rights holder. Once registered as a Torrens title, that right is, in principle, indefeasible, and cannot be lost through adverse possession. In other words, a third party who transacted in reliance on the register (and the Certificate of Title) is, in principle, protected. This high degree of trust placed in registration is the concept underlying Philippine real estate transactions, in stark contrast to Japan’s system.
The Certificate of Title as a “Security Document”
In Japan, the contents of a real estate registration can be obtained by anyone at any time as a Certificate of Registered Matters (a copy of the register) — it is, in a sense, merely a “copy of information.” There is no physical “certificate” that embodies the right itself.
In the Philippines, on the other hand, the Registry of Deeds issues an Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title — an official document issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA). This is not merely a copy of a certificate but a document with the character of a security instrument that embodies the right itself, and presenting and safekeeping the original is treated as critically important in transactions and when setting up loan collateral. The sense that “whoever holds the title certificate is the rights holder” is a concept largely absent from Japanese registration practice.
The Title Chain — A Structure That Discourages Double-Selling
This is where the existence of the title certificate comes into play, through what is known as the “title chain.” In the Philippines, when registering a transfer of real estate ownership, the original Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title held by the previous owner must be submitted to the Registry of Deeds and formally cancelled before a new certificate in the buyer’s name — a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), or a Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) for condominiums — can be issued.
In other words, the system strictly maintains a single unbroken chain: no new certificate can come into existence unless the previous one is invalidated first. This makes it structurally difficult for so-called double-selling to occur — where multiple valid certificates exist simultaneously for different buyers of the same property. Unlike Japan’s system, where registration is essentially just a matter of rewriting an entry in the register, the Philippine process involves physically recovering and invalidating the certificate itself, making it a design that more readily ensures the uniqueness of the right.
That said, this is the system’s theoretical design, and cases of forged title certificates or fraudulent registrations involving Registry of Deeds staff are not unheard of. In practice, obtaining a Certified True Copy from the Registry of Deeds and individually verifying the authenticity of a property’s title certificate remains an indispensable step.
A Condominium Has Only a Single Title Certificate
In Japanese condominium registration, even though the registration of the exclusively-owned unit and the registration of the land-use right (the shared interest in the land) are treated together in practice through a mechanism called “land-rights unification” (shikichiken-ka), the system itself is structured as a combination of two separate rights: the sectional ownership of the building and the right to use the land.
In the Philippines, this is simplified. Once registration of a sectional ownership interest is complete, the Land Registration Authority issues a single Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) per unit — and only one. This single CCT consolidates and represents both the right to the exclusively-owned unit and the equivalent shared interest in the land and common areas held through the Condominium Corporation. It can be described as a simple structure in which the title certificate is not split across multiple documents.
The Concept of a “Condominium with Land Attached”
It may come as a surprise from a Japanese perspective, but a Philippine condominium is, by legal design, real estate “with land attached.” Despite the constitutional restriction that foreigners cannot directly own land as individuals, foreign ownership of condominium units is permitted because the condominium as a whole (the building and its land) is treated as a single “juridical entity” — the Condominium Corporation — and a foreigner’s holding of a share in that corporation (i.e., sectional ownership of each unit) is treated as falling outside the land-ownership restrictions under the Constitution and foreign investment law.
Holding a CCT, therefore, is not merely an exclusive right to a volume of space in legal structure — it means holding a right integrated with the land itself, carrying a shared interest in the underlying property. One cannot own the land directly, but does hold a right indirectly connected to the land through the Condominium Corporation — this is the concept underlying the Philippines’ scheme for foreign real estate ownership, and it needs to be understood accurately.
The Balcony as Exclusively-Owned Space
Another point that surprises those accustomed to Japanese condominium practice is the treatment of balconies. Under Japan’s Act on Building Unit Ownership and standard management regulations, a balcony is legally a “common area,” and unit owners are granted only an “exclusive-use right” over it. Because balconies also function as emergency evacuation routes, unauthorized renovations or the installation of storage units are restricted and require approval from the management association — for this same reason.
In Philippine condominiums, by contrast, the balcony is generally treated as private area. It is customarily included in the unit’s Net Saleable Area and is subject to the buyer’s full ownership and use. The absence of Japan’s intermediate concept — “common area, but exclusive use is permitted” — with the balcony instead simply treated as “one’s own,” can be said to symbolize the difference in how the two countries conceive of sectional ownership.
The “Official Rule” of the 40% Foreign Ownership Cap and the Reality of the Secondary Market
The Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726) restricts foreign ownership in a single condominium building to less than 40% of the total floor area. This restriction is applied relatively strictly at the pre-selling (new-build) stage. Developers manage the foreign sales quota, and compliance with the 40% cap is checked both when registering with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (now under the DHSUD) and when registering a transfer of title with the Registry of Deeds.
The problem lies in the secondary (resale) market. Expert analysis has pointed out that “enforcement gaps” exist in tracking and managing foreign ownership ratios, particularly in unregistered provincial projects or properties where the Condominium Corporation’s own management is weak. In older buildings, or properties where the management association’s (Condominium Corporation’s) record-keeping is sloppy, it is not uncommon for the current foreign ownership ratio to be inaccurately tracked. As a result, even though the 40% rule nominally exists, how strictly it is actually enforced varies from property to property — this is the practical reality on the ground. Of course, deliberate circumvention using dummy (nominee) arrangements is a serious offense subject to criminal penalties under the Anti-Dummy Law, and must be clearly distinguished from this issue. This should instead be understood as an operational challenge — namely, that a gap tends to emerge between the system’s official rule and actual management practice at older properties.
For buyers, the remaining foreign quota on a new-build property can be confirmed directly with the developer, but when purchasing a resale unit, individually verifying the current foreign ownership ratio through the Condominium Corporation (management association) or a broker becomes even more important than it is in Japanese resale condominium transactions.
Recent Changes in Real Estate Law — Extended Land Lease Terms for Foreigners
Finally, a word on recent legislative changes. Under the Investor’s Lease Act (Republic Act No. 7652), foreign investors leasing private land in the Philippines were previously limited to an initial lease term of 25 years in principle, up to 50 years even with investment registration, and a maximum of 75 years total including renewal.
This changed significantly in 2025 with the amendment of the Investor’s Lease Act under Republic Act No. 12252. For approved and registered investment projects, lease terms of up to a total of 99 years are now permitted. A period of 99 years effectively enables asset management spanning three generations; while direct land ownership remains impossible, the aim is to offer foreign capital de facto stability of land use approaching that of a very-long-term surface right.
Alongside this, related legislation has been enacted in quick succession, including the ARROW Act (Accelerated and Reformed Right-of-Way Act), which speeds up the process of acquiring land for public works, and the Real Property Valuation and Assessment Reform Act (Republic Act No. 12001, 2024), aimed at fair market valuation. These reflect the government’s evident intent to shore up an office and condominium market that had languished amid the pandemic and the withdrawal of POGOs (Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators). It should be noted, however, that all of these reforms enhance the stability of leasing and using land — the fundamental principle set out in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, prohibiting outright land ownership by foreigners, remains unchanged.
Conclusion
A powerful title certificate grounded in the Torrens System, prevention of double-selling through the title chain, and a condominium system built on the concept of being “attached to land” — all of these are constructed on a logic different from Japan’s registration system, which is based on the perfection-requirement principle. This is a field where bringing in Japanese assumptions unchanged can easily lead to misunderstanding, and careful, property-by-property verification is essential, particularly on points prone to a gap between the system’s official rule and actual practice, such as foreign ownership ratios in resale condominiums. Understanding the institutional features of Philippine real estate correctly — while also taking account of recent legislative developments such as the 99-year lease — can be said to be the first step toward a safe transaction.
Sources: Philippine Supreme Court jurisprudence (Matthews v. Taylor, Hulst v. PR Builders), Republic Act No. 4726 (Condominium Act), Republic Act No. 7652 (Investor’s Lease Act), Republic Act No. 12252, Republic Act No. 12001 (Real Property Valuation and Assessment Reform Act), the Land Registration Authority, Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism “Overseas Construction and Real Estate Market Database,” Mercury General Law Office, One Asia Lawyers, and various industry commentary.
Philippines-Based Unregistered Bond Scheme: ¥17 Billion in Damages, 9 Arrested in Massive Fraud That Also Rocked the Nikkan Manila Shimbun
Philippines-based operators who illegally solicited Japanese investors to purchase foreign bonds without registering with Japan’s Financial Services Agency have been targeted in an investigation by a joint task force led by the Metropolitan Police Department’s Livelihood and Economic Affairs Division, which has been pursuing key figures behind a massive cross-border financial scandal.
A total of nine men and women have been arrested and charged in the case so far (some reports and the ongoing investigation have cited varying breakdowns, including seven or nine suspects). Damages are believed to exceed ¥17 billion, or roughly ¥46 billion when affiliated companies are included.
The case also sent shockwaves through the Japanese community and media in the Philippines, in particular through its strange entanglement with the once-prominent Japanese-language newspaper Nikkan Manila Shimbun.
1. Overview of the Case
At the center of the case is a Philippines-based overseas entity called S Division Holdings (SDH).
- Method: SDH aggressively solicited Japanese investors to purchase high-yield foreign bonds advertised with returns of “24% annually” and similar figures. However, it never filed the notifications or registrations with Japan’s regional Finance Bureaus required under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.
- Sophisticated recruitment tactics: The group held money seminars and schools in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka, and elsewhere, inviting guests such as former National Tax Agency officials to lend an air of credibility, and skillfully targeted women raising children and novice investors known as “freeters” to gather funds.
- Scale of funds: From around 2016 to 2024, the group is estimated to have illegally collected close to ¥46 billion from more than 5,500 people in total.
2. Key Individuals Arrested
The investigation has led to the arrest of the group’s de facto executives and the heads of its brokerage and agency networks on suspicion of violating the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.
- Hajime Sumi, 45: The de facto head of SDH, based in the Philippines.
- Aoi Ikeda, 38: A former president of SDH.
- Toyomi Hashimoto, 44: The de facto head of “Dzero,” an agency that brokered the financial products; she solicited housewives at seminars.
- Takahiro Imai (real name: Jeong Seung-ho), 42: Head of “Zero Management.”
- Nine people in total, including other accomplices involved in the illegal solicitation and fundraising, have been targeted in the crackdown.
3. Scale of the Damages
- Period and amount covered by the charges: Direct funds collected in the case, in which bonds were solicited without registration from around June 2021 to February 2023, alone amount to roughly ¥17 billion.
- Broader scope and total amount: The total funds the group is believed to have collected overall, including at its peak, reach an estimated ¥46 billion — among the largest overseas-based unregistered bond schemes in recent years. Many victims have been left with no recourse, reporting that “payments suddenly stopped” or that they “lost all contact” with the operators.
4. The Complex Ties to the Nikkan Manila Shimbun
One reason the case sent such shockwaves through the Japanese communities in Japan and the Philippines was its connection to the Nikkan Manila Shimbun, a newspaper long cherished by the local community.
- Acquisition and financial trouble: The Nikkan Manila Shimbun, the Philippines’ only long-established Japanese-language newspaper, was going through financial difficulties around the time reports emerged of capital and management ties between the paper and organizations connected to this case.
- The end of an era for the paper: Despite its reputation for trust and tradition, the shadow cast by this murky flow of funds and the ensuing troubles thoroughly destabilized the paper’s finances, becoming one of the underlying factors that ultimately led it to end its history as a print publication (suspending, and later ceasing, publication).
- The paper’s own position: After the case came to light, voices from local media and other parties argued that “the illegal fundraising scheme itself should be viewed separately from the Manila Shimbun’s legitimate work as a news organization” — a painful episode that has come to symbolize both the light and shadow of the Japanese community abroad.
Summary
This is a textbook case of a high-yield, unregistered bond fraud scheme that presumed — mistakenly — that basing itself overseas, in the Philippines, would keep it beyond the reach of Japanese law enforcement. Although Japan’s Financial Services Agency and police have advanced the crackdown, recovering the enormous sums that flowed out of the country remains an uphill battle, and the case has once again driven home for investors the risks lurking behind sweet-sounding promises.
The Philippines’ Demographic Miscalculation — From Pre-Pandemic Optimism to the Shock of a 1.7 Fertility Rate
Introduction
“By 2028, the Philippines’ population will overtake Japan’s” — until just a few years ago, this forecast was treated as an almost unquestioned premise in discussions of Southeast Asia’s growth story. Based on the United Nations’ medium population projections, major media outlets including Japan’s Nikkei repeatedly reported the contrast between “a young Philippines and an aging Japan,” and estimates that the Philippines’ “demographic dividend” would last from around 2045 until as late as 2075 were widely shared.
But in 2026, news emerged that shook that premise. The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported that the total fertility rate (TFR) for 2023–25 had fallen to a record low of 1.7 — well below the 2.1 replacement level needed to sustain a population. A country once called “Asia’s last bastion” of high fertility is, within just a few years, joining the ranks of low-birthrate nations.
This article lays out, with a timeline, the optimistic demographic outlook the Philippines once took pride in before the pandemic, and the sharp changes that have followed it, and considers what they mean.
Timeline: The Light and Shadow of Philippine Demographics
- 1970s: Total fertility rate (TFR) above 6.0 — the Philippines establishes itself as a high-fertility nation
- 2013: Population surpasses 100 million; UN medium projections widely reported to forecast the Philippines “overtaking Japan by 2028”
- 2017: TFR falls to 2.7 (still above the 2.1 replacement level)
- 2019 (pre-pandemic): With a high share of working-age population, estimates hold that the “demographic dividend” will last until 2045, or as late as 2075 in long-range forecasts
- 2020: COVID-19 spreads; census puts total population at approximately 109.04 million
- 2020–2022: Strict pandemic lockdowns, disruption to healthcare and maternity services, and economic anxiety affect family planning
- 2021: TFR plunges to 1.8 (announced by the NEDA Secretary)
- 2022: TFR at 1.9 — a sharp drop from 2.7 in 2017, falling below the 2.1 replacement level for the first time
- July 2024: Census puts total population at approximately 112.73 million; the 2020–24 population growth rate is 0.8%, sharply down from 1.63% in 2015–20
- March 2026: PSA announces a 2023–25 TFR of 1.7, a record low; analysts warn of the risk of “getting old before getting rich”
- 2026: The Philippines’ estimated population stands at roughly 117.7 million. Under UN medium projections, a gap with Japan’s population (around 120 million) still remains, but the high fertility rate that underpinned the “2028 overtake” scenario has already collapsed
(Note: PSA = Philippine Statistics Authority; NEDA = National Economic and Development Authority; TFR = Total Fertility Rate)
Before COVID: The Story of a “Demographic Dividend” Nation
Before the pandemic, the narrative surrounding the Philippines was consistently upbeat. With a median age in the early twenties and a working-age population (ages 15–64) making up more than 60% of the total, UN population projections forecast that the Philippines would “reach 123 million and overtake Japan by 2028.” Against this demographic backdrop, the Philippines was dubbed “Asia’s next economic tiger,” leveraging its abundant young workforce and English proficiency to expand its BPO industry, including call centers, and post strong real GDP growth.
The fertility rate itself had been gradually declining from more than 6.0 in the 1970s, but as of 2017 it still stood at 2.7 — a level that continued to grow the population. This “youthfulness” was the single biggest reason the Philippines drew attention as both an investment destination and a source of labor.
After COVID: The “Miscalculation” of a Sudden Fertility Decline
But the pace of decline since the start of the 2020s has outstripped even expert predictions. From 2.7 in 2017, the rate fell to 1.9 in 2022, and then all the way down to 1.7 in 2023–25. In other words, within just a few years of dropping below the 2.1 replacement level, it fell by more than a further 0.2 points.
The PSA attributes this slowdown in population growth to a combination of factors beyond the falling birthrate itself, including elevated mortality during the pandemic and increased emigration. As for the underlying social factors, it points to:
- Rising age of marriage and childbirth as women pursue higher education and careers
- Rising living costs, particularly in urban areas, and inflation increasing the burden of raising children
- Declining influence of the Catholic Church and diversifying values, including reduced resistance to contraception and family planning
- Changes in lifestyle and values driven by the spread of social media
In a country where roughly 80% of the population is Catholic and resistance to contraception and family planning has long run deep, such a rapid decline in births is considered highly unusual.
Analysts have also warned that the Philippines faces a growing risk of falling into the trap many emerging economies have encountered — “getting old before getting rich.”
What Becomes of the “Demographic Dividend”?
A demographic dividend refers to a favorable population structure — a high share of working-age people — that boosts economic growth. The Philippines’ dividend was once expected to last until 2045, or as late as 2075 under optimistic long-term scenarios, but the sharp fall in fertility is now shaking that very premise.
That said, some argue the decline in fertility need not be viewed only pessimistically. The Commission on Population and Development (CPD) has also acknowledged that falling fertility can bring economic benefits, such as poverty reduction and a rising labor force participation rate, with forecasts suggesting a labor force participation rate above 63% could continue into the early 2030s. The median age of the population remains young, at around 26, leaving open the possibility that the Philippines can retain its strength in labor supply for another decade or more.
Will the “Population Reversal” with Japan Actually Happen?
The forecast widely reported around 2013–14 that the Philippines would “overtake Japan by 2028” was based on the UN’s medium population projections at the time. Because Japan’s own population continues to decline, the gap between the two countries remains on a narrowing trend. But with the Philippines’ fertility rate having fallen this sharply, it has become uncertain whether the timing of any reversal, and the population trajectories that would follow, will unfold as originally assumed.
In any case, the simple contrast of “an aging Japan and a young Philippines” appears to be entering a phase in which it will itself have to be reconsidered.
Conclusion
Across the great divide of the pandemic, the Philippines’ demographic image is shifting dramatically — from a “thriving demographic-dividend nation” to a “country undergoing rapid fertility decline.” While the overall population continues to grow in absolute terms, its underlying substance — the fertility rate, the future shape of its age structure — has clearly begun to diverge from the optimistic scenarios described before COVID.
From the perspective of someone who has long done business in the Philippines, this shift cannot be overlooked. Business strategies premised on a young workforce and robust domestic consumption may need to be reconsidered over the coming ten to twenty years. How long the tailwind of the demographic dividend will last, and how the Philippine economy will adapt once it fades, are themes we intend to keep watching closely.
Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), UN Population Division World Population Prospects, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) overseas business information, and various news reports.
Foreign Ownership Rules for Philippine Retail Are Relaxed — Why Setting Up in a Mall Is Now Essential for Success
Introduction
On April 13, 2026, President Marcos signed Executive Order No. 113, promulgating the 13th Foreign Investment Negative List. The list took formal effect on May 2 of the same year. The revision itself was primarily intended to correctly reflect, within the list, changes already introduced in recent years through amendments to the Retail Trade Liberalization Act and the Public Service Act, and to resolve discrepancies in how those changes were described in practice. Even so, its substance carries major implications for foreign nationals and foreign companies seeking to operate retail businesses in the Philippines. For Japanese nationals and Japanese companies in particular, entry into retail — long regarded as a hurdle too high to clear — has now become a realistic option.
What Changed: Minimum Capital and Foreign Ownership Share
First, a brief look back at the history of foreign ownership restrictions on retail. Under the original Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, foreign entry into retail required paid-in capital of at least US$2.5 million (roughly ¥260 million), with an additional investment of at least US$830,000 required for each physical store. For small and mid-sized businesses, this was, in practice, an insurmountable threshold.
In 2021, an amendment to the Retail Trade Liberalization Act under Republic Act No. 11595 lowered this minimum paid-in capital sharply to 25 million pesos (roughly ¥50–60 million, or about US$500,000), and eased the per-store additional investment requirement to at least 10 million pesos. Requirements related to net worth, number of stores, and retail track record were also eliminated, opening the door to mid-sized retail businesses.
The 13th Foreign Investment Negative List now clarifies, for the first time in explicit terms, how retail businesses below that 25-million-peso threshold are to be treated. It formally establishes that a retail business with paid-in capital below 25 million pesos may still admit foreign nationals or foreign companies, provided the foreign ownership share does not exceed 40%. Previously, it was generally understood that foreign capital was, in practice, entirely excluded from small-scale retail businesses below that capital threshold; this new explicit provision formally recognizes room for entry — through foreign ownership of up to 40% — even for small, low-capital retail stores.
This amendment aligns retail regulation with the general principle applied to domestic-market-oriented companies under the Foreign Investments Act — namely, that companies below a certain paid-in capital threshold serving the domestic market are, in principle, limited to 40% foreign ownership — and can be understood as correcting a situation in which retail alone had been treated less favorably.
What the Wider Opening Means in Practice
The impact of this amendment is not limited to making it easier for major retail chains to enter the market. What matters more in practice is that it has clarified a path for foreign nationals to take an equity stake in retail businesses at the scale of an individual proprietorship or a small storefront.
Until now, a Japanese national looking to run a small retail store in the Philippines often faced a choice between two options: relying entirely on a local partner (in effect, operating under a Filipino national’s name), or raising mid-sized or larger capital sufficient to clear the 25-million-peso threshold. With this amendment now allowing up to 40% equity participation even for small, low-capital stores, it is likely that more Japanese nationals will pursue joint ventures with local partners to enter retail at a scale suited to their means. Food and beverage businesses are already generally permitted 100% foreign ownership, but many operators in categories that include a retail component — select shops, food retail, general merchandise stores, and the like — stand to benefit from this amendment as well.
Why Setting Up in a Mall Is the Default Strategy
That said, when it comes to running a retail or food-and-beverage business in the Philippines, something matters even more than capital restrictions: location strategy — specifically, where to open. For anyone doing business in the Philippines, there is really only one answer: the mall.
In the Philippines’ tropical climate, standalone street-front shops are constantly exposed to intense midday heat and sudden downpours. Air-conditioned shopping malls, by contrast, function for Filipino consumers as an oasis to escape the heat. It is not unusual for families to spend an entire holiday inside a mall, and malls serve, in effect, as a kind of public space in Philippine urban life — not merely commercial facilities.
Three companies dominate mall development in Metro Manila:
- SM Prime Holdings (SM Supermalls): The country’s largest mall operator, with more than 86 malls nationwide and a target of reaching 100 domestic locations within 2026.
- Robinsons Land (Robinsons Malls): The country’s second-largest mall operator, running 57 malls as of the end of 2025.
- Ayala Malls: A developer with particular strength among affluent consumers, operating around 31 malls concentrated in upscale areas such as Makati and BGC.
While specific terms vary somewhat between operators, the contract conditions tenants face are broadly similar across these malls. It is common practice to pay a percentage-of-sales rent — a fixed base rent plus CUSA (Common Use Service Area) charges, plus a percentage of monthly sales (for food and beverage tenants, typically around 5%) — and virtually all three developers, SM, Robinsons, and Ayala, require substantial upfront funds before opening, including a security deposit equivalent to three months’ rent and three months of rent paid in advance. Contracts also typically include an annual rent escalation clause of roughly 5–10%, and it is not uncommon for tenants whose sales growth fails to keep pace with rising rent to be forced out within a few years.
In other words, in the Philippines, success in retail and food-and-beverage business hinges less on which mall to choose than on how to draw customers under these largely standardized conditions and achieve sales growth that outpaces rising rent.
Success Stories in Multi-Store Expansion: Uniqlo, Ramen Nagi, and Marugame Udon
A leading example of success in multi-store expansion under this mall-centered, standardized-terms market structure is Uniqlo (Fast Retailing). Since opening its first store at SM Mall of Asia in 2012 through a joint venture with the SM Group, Uniqlo has steadily expanded its network across SM, Robinsons, and Ayala malls. It had just 6 stores in 2013 — fourth place within ASEAN — but grew to 43 stores by 2017, overtaking Malaysia to rank first in ASEAN. By the end of May 2024 it had 76 stores, and according to Fast Retailing’s own official figures, it had reached 81 stores as of June 30, 2026. This is the largest store count of any Southeast Asian market for the brand, ahead of Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand alike, making the Philippines Uniqlo’s largest market in Southeast Asia. Rather than pursuing a standalone street-front strategy, expanding from within malls through a joint venture with the SM Group has been the single biggest factor behind this success.
A similar pattern is clearly visible among Japanese food-and-beverage businesses. Ramen Nagi, for instance, has grown to 41 stores since entering the Philippines in 2013, according to local interviews with staff of its operating company — the largest count among all the countries and regions where the chain operates, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China, and Singapore. Its stores are concentrated in major malls across Makati, BGC (Taguig), Pasay, Mall of Asia, and the area around SM Aura, and a strong network with major mall developer Robinsons Land is said to have supported this expansion. Ippudo, along with Mendokoro Ramenba — less well known in Japan but well regarded locally, with a location inside Philippine Isetan — have likewise expanded their store networks centered on Metro Manila’s major malls.
The udon chain Marugame Udon offers another good example of mall-centered multi-store expansion. Toridoll Holdings opened its first Philippine location in BGC in August 2017 through a franchise agreement with local company B.V. Cuisine (under Suyen Corporation). The original plan called for a modest 10 stores by 2020, but the chain had already reached 14 stores by the end of February 2021, expanding to 16 with the opening of SM Mall of Asia and Robinsons Galleria locations that May. Growth accelerated from there, reaching around 40 stores by the end of June 2023, and the company officially announced it had reached 50 Philippine stores with the opening of the “Marugame Udon OPUS” location on July 17, 2024 — its 50th in the country. That marks an expansion to roughly 50 stores in about seven years since entry, another clear case of growth driven by concentrated openings in large malls, including SM malls.
What these success stories share is a strategy of expanding across multiple stores through the infrastructure malls provide, building brand recognition and scale simultaneously, rather than settling for a single, popular standalone location. In the Philippines, the model of a single thriving shop on a prime street corner tends to be less reliably successful than opening simultaneously across multiple malls — an approach that spreads the risk of rent increases and fluctuating foot traffic while stabilizing the business as a whole.
Outlook: Will More Japanese Businesses Enter Philippine Retail?
Given all this, this revision to the Negative List will almost certainly accelerate the entry of Japanese nationals and small and mid-sized Japanese companies into Philippine retail. It matters a great deal that a sector long seen as blocked by overly strict capital requirements has now become a realistic option — entry with as little as up to 40% equity participation, even on a small capital base.
That said, a lower barrier to entry does not guarantee success. As with Uniqlo, Ramen Nagi, and Marugame Udon, businesses will increasingly be judged on whether they plan, from the outset, for mall-centered multi-store expansion, and on whether they can build the brand strength and operational capability needed to grow sales faster than the standardized, steadily rising rents malls impose.
Conclusion
The clarification of retail regulations under the 13th Foreign Investment Negative List is a regulatory change Japanese businesspeople exploring opportunities in the Philippines should not overlook. Now that the capital barrier to entry has been lowered, correctly understanding the realities of the Philippines’ mall-centered, standardized business environment — and building a business plan premised on expansion across multiple malls rather than a single street-front shop — is likely the surest path to success.
Sources: Executive Order No. 113 (13th Foreign Investment Negative List); Republic Act No. 11595 (amended Retail Trade Liberalization Act); One Asia Lawyers; Camellia Consulting Co., Ltd.; Nikkei; Fast Retailing official website, “Southeast Asia & Oceania” (data as of June 30, 2026); Toridoll Holdings press release, “Marugame Udon Reaches 50 Stores in the Philippines” (July 2024); Philippine Primer (local reporting); Ryutsu News; Wikipedia (SM Supermalls, Robinsons Malls, Ayala Malls); various industry commentary and local reports.
“Great Men of the Philippines: José Rizal” (Part 1)
By Yasotarō Mōri
Chapter 1: The Thorny Path
José Rizal was born the seventh child (and second son) into an old family in the town of Calamba, on the shore of Laguna de Bay, in Laguna Province, Luzon. The family appears to have lived a fairly prosperous life, of a standing one might call well-to-do farmers. He had one elder brother, five elder sisters, and three younger sisters. Both sides of his family were of respectable lineage; his family tree shows Chinese blood going back several generations through his grandfather and great-grandfather, and it is said that one of his great-grandfathers was Japanese. Both of his parents had received an education advanced for Filipinos of the time, and they were extremely devoted to their children’s education. It is said that Rizal inherited from his father the brave temperament that would not yield an inch once he believed himself to be right, and from his mother his abundant natural talent.
Looking back now on Rizal’s life, one gets the impression that he never really had an ordinary childhood. Intellectually, he was always three or four years ahead of children his own age — the spark of what is called a child prodigy. Around the age of three, taught by his mother and sisters, he learned the basics — the “ABCs,” so to speak — of the native Tagalog language. He soon began comparative study of Tagalog and Spanish, and by the age of five, it is said, he could easily read the Spanish Bible. There were other men of letters in his day, but it is said that none quoted the Bible in their writing as extensively as Rizal did, a result, no doubt, of his having read it so closely at such a young age. Around this time he also showed artistic talent, drawing pictures and skillfully working in wax.
His mother constantly encouraged his poetry, and at the age of eight he wrote a poem for a town celebration and presented it to the organizers. It was so well made that he received a prize from the governor for it. At nine, he wrote a poem in Tagalog titled “Our Mother Tongue,” extolling love of one’s homeland through respect for the national language — a piece so thoroughly conceived and phrased that it hardly seems the work of a boy. Another poem he wrote that same year, titled “My Mother’s Birthday,” expressed a pure-hearted devotion to his mother, and is counted among the finest of the many poems he composed over his lifetime.
▲ The Spark of a Child Prodigy ▼
When he was nine, his father sent him to a school in the nearby town of Biñan. His uncle, José Alberto, lived there, and Rizal boarded with him — his own name, José, was given in honor of this uncle. In his few months at that school, his grades were outstanding. After a few months, the headmaster sent him home, telling him, “There is nothing more this school can teach you.” His father, thinking Rizal must have done something wrong and been expelled, grew angry — but the headmaster met with his father in person, showed him just how excellent Rizal’s schoolwork was, and demonstrated that there was truly no longer any need for him to remain at the school, at which his father was satisfied. Such was the anecdote that survived to illustrate the almost prodigious sharpness Rizal showed in mastering his lessons.
During this short spell of schooling in Biñan, he learned a great deal about the wider world — not so much from the school itself as from everyday life in his uncle’s household. Four years before Rizal was born, Sir John Bowring, the Governor of Hong Kong, had visited various parts of the Philippines and stayed as a guest in this uncle’s home. Bowring, known in his day in various circles as a linguist, told the uncle at that time about a book written long before by a Spaniard named Morga, titled Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (An Account of the Philippine Islands) — the uncle himself being a Filipino of considerable education and standing.
Hearing these stories from his uncle, Rizal vowed to himself: first, that he too would become a devoted scholar like Bowring; and second, that he would one day obtain Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas and have it read by Filipinos generally. Almost twenty years later, while studying in London, he found this very book in the British Museum, painstakingly transcribed it by hand, had it further copied, and distributed it widely — thereby fulfilling the long-cherished ambition he had carried since boyhood.
Had things gone on this way without incident, Rizal might well have ended his days simply as a respected notable — an admirable gentleman of radiant bearing and exceptional talent, admired by all yet nothing more. But Heaven placed this prodigy upon the stage of trial. When he was eleven, his father decided to enroll him at the Ateneo Municipal de Manila to give him a higher education. It was while he was preparing for this that two incidents occurred which would cast a lifelong shadow over his heart and mind. And so he was set upon the fate of walking the thorny path.
1. Why Is Metro Manila’s Bay Area Overrun With Unsold Condominiums?
- The exit of POGOs (Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators): The Chinese-oriented POGO operators that once powerfully drove demand for Bay Area condominiums withdrew one after another amid tighter government regulation and a policy shift. This caused rental demand to collapse, and a large number of units that had been purchased for investment purposes were suddenly left vacant or put up for sale all at once.
- A construction boom mismatched with demand: Developers built an oversupply of high-rise condominiums before and during the pandemic, but subsequent interest rate hikes, an economic slowdown, and shifting buyer preferences (a growing tendency to favor larger houses in the suburbs, for example) combined to leave developers unable to absorb the resulting inventory.
- A massive glut of unsold units: Tens of thousands of unsold, ready-for-occupancy (RFO) units exist across Metro Manila as a whole, and the Bay Area is one of the areas where this oversupply is especially concentrated.
2. Just How Steep Are the Discounts and Incentives?
According to real estate experts and observers of local market trends, developers have avoided sharply crashing listed prices outright, but are competing to offer substantial effective discounts and extraordinary promotions that favor buyers. Specific examples include the following.
- Steep cash promotions (discounts): Depending on the property and purchase terms, cash discounts of 15% to 30%, and in extreme cases as much as 50%, off the list price have been offered.
- Dramatically eased down-payment and payment terms: The normally strict payment terms for pre-selling (units sold before or during construction) have been significantly relaxed — with lower initial down payments, interest-free installment plans, or longer-than-usual payment schedules (spread over several years, for example).
- “Fully furnished” units and waived fees: Developers eager to move inventory quickly commonly furnish units from the outset with air conditioners, refrigerators, beds, and other furniture and appliances (fully furnished), or waive or absorb various fees normally borne by the buyer, such as registration and transfer taxes.
- Use of rent-to-own arrangements: Sales structures that minimize buyer risk are also becoming common — such as living in (or paying rent on) a unit first, with that amount later applied toward the eventual purchase price.
Summary
The reason the discounts are described as “severe” is that sellers, cornered by the exodus of POGOs and cooling demand after prices had been inflated beyond fair value during the boom years, now find themselves forced into indiscriminate discounting simply to recover their capital.
While this represents a fully buyer’s market that gives prospective purchasers considerable negotiating leverage, analysts familiar with the local market warn that, because future appreciation and a recovery in rental yields remain difficult to foresee, buying in too readily carries the risk of ending up with an asset that is difficult to resell — a potential trap for the unwary.
