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MANILA NEWS DAILY

August 11, 2026 (Tuesday) Edition
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MNLF, MILF, BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, Maute — Decommissioning, Amnesty, and Can Former Combatants Run for Office? (Part 4 of 4, Final)

MNLF, MILF, BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, Maute — Decommissioning, Amnesty, and Can Former Combatants Run for Office?

Armed groups in the southern Philippines are often referred to by a string of English-letter acronyms, and are frequently discussed as if they were all the same kind of organization.

But the MNLF, MILF, BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, and the Maute Group differ in when they were formed, their political goals, and their relationship with the government.

The most important thing for understanding today’s Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is distinguishing between groups that joined the peace process and moved into legal political activity, and groups that rejected peace and continue armed struggle or terrorism.

There are also questions of how far amnesty absolves former combatants of past crimes, and whether their voting rights and eligibility to run for office are restored.

This final installment sorts out the differences among these armed groups and their subsequent political participation.

What Is the MNLF?

The largest Moro armed group in the southern Philippines used to be the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front).

The MNLF began its armed struggle in the early 1970s, seeking autonomy or independence for the Moro people of the southern Philippines. Its founding leader was Nur Misuari.

The MILF later split off amid internal disagreements over strategy, and the BIFF later split off from the MILF. The rough lineage is as follows.

MNLF
→ the MILF splits off
→ the BIFF splits off from the MILF

Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group, on the other hand, cannot be explained solely by this lineage of political-organization splits. They are groups formed through a complex mix of international extremist ideology, local crime, foreign fighters, and allegiance to the Islamic State (IS).

Key Differences Among the Main Groups

GroupFull NameMain Goal/CharacterRelationship with the Government
MNLFMoro National Liberation FrontSought autonomy and political rights for the Moro peopleFinal peace agreement in 1996
MILFMoro Islamic Liberation FrontSought stronger autonomy and an Islamic political communityComprehensive peace agreement in 2014
BIFFBangsamoro Islamic Freedom FightersArmed faction that rejected the MILF’s peace trackNot covered by the peace agreement
Abu Sayyaf GroupAbu Sayyaf GroupExtremism, kidnapping, ransom demands, terrorismTarget of security operations
Maute GroupMaute GroupExtremist armed faction claiming allegiance to ISTarget of security operations

Although all are called Islamic armed groups, the MNLF and MILF accepted peace with the government and have moved to transform themselves into political organizations.

The BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, and the Maute Group, by contrast, are not legal political forces that make up the BARMM government.

MNLF — The First Large-Scale Moro National Movement

The MNLF was the central organization of the Moro national movement that expanded across the southern Philippines in the 1970s.

After fierce fighting under the Marcos administration, it signed the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, brokered by Libya. But disputes over the scope and implementation of autonomy went unresolved, and armed clashes continued.

In 1996, the Ramos administration and the MNLF signed a final peace agreement. This brought the MNLF, in principle, into legal political participation.

Founder Nur Misuari once served as governor of the former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). At the same time, disputes with the government over implementation of the peace agreement recurred, and the MNLF itself split into multiple factions.

Today’s MNLF is divided among a faction led by founding chairman Misuari and another led by Muslimin Sema, among others. Both factions, however, remain within the government’s peace framework.

Muslimin Sema, who once served as mayor of Cotabato City, has held posts such as BARMM’s labor and employment minister and a seat in the interim parliament — moving toward administrative and political activity rather than armed struggle.

Nur Misuari, too, continues to be active as the MNLF’s founding leader, taking part in talks with the government.

It is therefore inaccurate to view the MNLF today as a single, monolithic anti-government force. Although the organization has split, its main factions have chosen the path of peace and political participation.

MILF — The Organization That Achieved BARMM’s Establishment

The MILF is an organization that split off from the MNLF.

Its founding leader was Salamat Hashim, who pushed a stronger Islamic character than the MNLF while continuing armed struggle against the Philippine government.

After Salamat Hashim’s death, Ahod “Al Haj Murad” Ebrahim became chairman.

After long peace negotiations, the MILF signed the “Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro” with the Philippine government in 2014. This peace agreement was translated into law through the Bangsamoro Organic Law enacted in 2018.

In 2019, BARMM was formally established, and Murad Ebrahim led the regional government as its first interim Chief Minister. He stepped down as interim Chief Minister in 2025, but continues his political activity as MILF chairman and leader of the United Bangsamoro Justice Party.

The MILF is in the process of transforming itself from an armed group into a legal social and political movement. That said, its decommissioning is not fully complete.

How Far Has MILF Decommissioning Progressed?

MILF decommissioning is not simply a matter of taking guns away from soldiers.

Under the peace agreement, it is carried out as part of “Normalization”: combatants and weapons are verified and removed from the military organization, and former combatants and their families are provided education, vocational training, healthcare, and cash assistance to transition to civilian life.

Decommissioning is handled by a third-party body called the Independent Decommissioning Body.

According to the Philippine government, from 2015 through the third phase, roughly 26,000 MILF combatants and 4,625 weapons had been processed for decommissioning.

PhaseCombatants CoveredWeapons Covered
Phase 114575
Phase 212,0002,100
Phase 3Approx. 13,9872,450
Phase 4 (planned)14,0002,575

Phase 4 is meant to be the final phase, but the MILF decided to postpone it, arguing that the government had not sufficiently fulfilled its obligations, such as socioeconomic support for former combatants.

In July 2025, the government announced that decommissioning of the 14,000 combatants and 2,575 weapons planned for the final phase had been postponed.

In other words, MILF decommissioning has advanced significantly but is not complete.

The number of decommissioned combatants and the number of weapons are also not the same figure. This is not a system where each combatant surrenders exactly one gun — rather, combatants and weapons that the organization declares are verified and processed in stages.

Looking at these numbers alone, it is not possible to precisely calculate how many weapons remain unsurrendered.

BIFF — Split From the MILF in Opposition to Peace

The BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters) was founded by Ameril Umbra Kato, who opposed the MILF’s peace negotiations.

Kato broke away from the MILF, opposing the abandonment of independence demands through peace with the Philippine government. After his death in 2015, the BIFF split into multiple factions.

The BIFF is not a party to the comprehensive peace agreement between the government and the MILF. It is therefore not automatically absorbed into the MILF’s decommissioning system either.

Some members have surrendered to the government, handed over weapons, and joined reintegration programs. But the remaining forces are targets of military and police security operations, and are not a formal part of the BARMM government.

BIFF members are not entitled to MILF-directed amnesty simply because they once belonged to the MILF. It is judged case by case which period, which organization, and which crime is involved.

Abu Sayyaf — On the Border Between Political Movement and Criminal Organization

The Abu Sayyaf Group was founded in the early 1990s by Abdurajak Janjalani.

Janjalani died in 1998, and the group was subsequently led by figures including his brother Khadaffy Janjalani. Khadaffy also died, in 2006.

Abu Sayyaf later split into multiple factions operating in areas such as Basilan and Sulu.

While claiming to seek the establishment of an Islamic state, it repeatedly carried out kidnappings of foreigners and local residents, ransom demands, bombings, and killings — meaning it has been treated both as a political anti-government group and as a terrorist/criminal organization.

In recent years it is said to have been significantly weakened by military and police operations, the deaths of leaders, and the surrender of members. However, it cannot be stated with certainty that small remaining factions or affiliates have disappeared entirely.

Unlike the MNLF or MILF, Abu Sayyaf today has no single representative leader whom the government recognizes as a peace-negotiation counterpart. It is more accurate to understand it as a set of regionally fragmented remnant factions.

The Maute Group — the IS-Affiliated Force That Seized Marawi

The Maute Group formed in Lanao del Sur province, centered on the brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute.

The group declared allegiance to the Islamic State, and in 2017, together with Abu Sayyaf’s Isnilon Hapilon and others, seized Marawi city.

The fighting lasted roughly five months, and urban warfare with the Philippine military left many dead and displaced. Both Maute brothers and Hapilon died in the fighting.

After the Battle of Marawi, the group’s core was destroyed, but there remains a possibility that surviving members or support networks continue operating under different names or as small cells.

The Maute Group is not a party to the peace process that established BARMM. It is therefore not guaranteed political participation as a “former rebel group” in the same way as the MILF or MNLF.

Amnesty Is Not a System That “Unconditionally Absolves Everyone”

The Philippine government has established an amnesty program for MILF and MNLF members.

The current legal basis is Presidential Proclamations No. 405 and No. 406, issued in November 2023.

  • Proclamation No. 405 covers MILF members
  • Proclamation No. 406 covers MNLF members

Eligible for amnesty are acts such as rebellion, incitement, illegal assembly, and resistance to authorities carried out in connection with the pursuit of political beliefs.

Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, and explosives incidental to rebellion or unrest can also be covered, under certain conditions.

But simply having belonged to an organization does not mean automatic amnesty.

Applicants must swear to and acknowledge their involvement in the covered crimes, and must surrender any firearms, weapons, or explosives in their possession. The National Amnesty Commission reviews applications, and a certificate of amnesty is issued to those ultimately approved.

Applying alone does not establish amnesty.

Some Crimes Are Not Covered by Amnesty

Amnesty for MILF and MNLF members is not a system that erases all past crimes.

The following crimes are, in principle, excluded from amnesty.

  • Kidnapping for ransom
  • Massacre
  • Rape
  • Acts of terrorism
  • Crimes committed for personal gain
  • Illegal drug offenses
  • Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
  • Genocide
  • Crimes against humanity
  • War crimes
  • Torture
  • Enforced disappearance
  • Other serious human rights violations

It is therefore incorrect to assume that “joining the peace process absolves all crimes, including murder or kidnapping.”

The system distinguishes between crimes that can be pardoned as political rebellion and crimes punished as acts committed for personal gain or as atrocities.

Also, even when amnesty extinguishes criminal liability, civil liability — such as damages owed to victims — remains.

Are Amnesty Applicants Protected From Arrest?

In April 2025, the government established a system to issue Safe Conduct Passes to certain amnesty applicants.

This is meant to let former members who might otherwise avoid applying out of fear of arrest come forward safely and undergo review.

However, the pass has its limits.

  • It does not release someone already detained under a valid arrest warrant
  • It does not authorize possession of unregistered firearms
  • Holding the pass alone does not finalize amnesty
  • It does not protect against crimes not covered by amnesty

In other words, a Safe Conduct Pass is not a “certificate that you can do anything without being arrested.”

Can Former Combatants Run for Elected Office?

Having been a former MILF or MNLF member is not, in itself, a reason to lose eligibility to run for office.

Transitioning from an armed group to a legal party or social movement, and pursuing political goals through elections, is a central purpose of the peace agreement.

In practice, some former MILF and MNLF leaders have served as members of the BARMM interim parliament, cabinet ministers in the autonomous government, and heads of local government units.

The MILF organized the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, and various MNLF factions are also moving into electoral politics.

This does not mean, however, that any former combatant can run for office unconditionally.

Under Philippine election law, those with the following final criminal convictions may lose eligibility to run for office.

  • Crimes related to rebellion, insurrection, or subversion
  • Crimes punished with a sentence exceeding 18 months
  • Crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e. serious moral depravity
  • Election offenses
  • Crimes carrying permanent disqualification from public office

For local elections, separate disqualification provisions under the Local Government Code also apply.

On the other hand, if someone formally receives a full or appropriate amnesty, civil and political rights suspended or lost due to the crime may be restored, potentially reviving eligibility to run for office.

Presidential Proclamations No. 405 and No. 406 likewise provide that formal amnesty restores civil and political rights suspended or lost due to conviction.

That said, actual eligibility is judged case by case, based on the content of the amnesty certificate, the type of crime, the sentence, any accessory penalties, and the office being sought.

Do Many Former Members Lose Their Voting Rights?

Under Philippine law, those convicted of certain crimes may have their voting rights suspended or forfeited.

But there is no reliable public statistic that tallies the number of people who have lost voting rights broken down by former affiliation — MILF, MNLF, BIFF, and so on.

It is therefore not possible to assert that “most former armed-group members have been stripped of their voting rights.”

In reality, a mix of the following types of people exists.

Status of Former MemberApproach to Voting Rights/Eligibility to Run
No criminal recordIn principle, treated the same as any ordinary citizen
Charged, but no convictionBeing charged alone does not uniformly strip rights
Final criminal convictionMay be restricted depending on the sentence and type of crime
Received formal amnestyPolitical rights related to the covered crime may be restored
Amnesty application pendingRights restoration is not confirmed by application alone
Convicted of a serious crime excluded from amnestySubject to ordinary criminal and election-law restrictions

What matters is not which organization someone belonged to in the past, but whether there is a final criminal conviction, what crime they were punished for, and whether amnesty was formally granted.

Where Are the Former Leaders Now?

A summary of the main organizations, their leaders, and their status to date is as follows.

GroupKey LeaderStatus to Date
MNLFNur MisuariInvolved in peace talks with the government as founding chairman
Main MNLF factionMuslimin SemaMoved into political/administrative activity; held public office in BARMM
MILFMurad EbrahimMILF chairman; served as BARMM’s first interim Chief Minister, now in party politics
BIFFAmeril Umbra KatoDied 2015; organization split into multiple factions
Abu SayyafAbdurajak JanjalaniDied 1998
Abu SayyafKhadaffy JanjalaniDied 2006
Maute GroupAbdullah and Omar Maute (brothers)Died in the 2017 Battle of Marawi
Joint IS-affiliated forceIsnilon HapilonDied in the 2017 Battle of Marawi

The main leaders of the MNLF and MILF moved from armed struggle into political negotiation, administration, and electoral activity.

Meanwhile, most of the prominent leaders of the BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, and the Maute Group died in security operations or fighting, and their organizations fragmented and weakened. That said, a leader’s death does not automatically mean the disappearance of remaining members, illegal weapons, financing networks, or family/community ties.

Peace Is Not a Story of “an Armed Group Taking Over the Government”

In BARMM, leaders and former members of the MILF, who once fought the state, now take part in running the government.

Viewing this simply as “an armed group whose past crimes were absolved and that then became the government as-is” fails to capture the actual structure of the peace system.

What the peace agreement aimed for was building a system in which pursuing political demands through elections, parliament, political parties, and administration is more effective than continuing armed struggle.

To that end, the establishment of the autonomous government, fiscal authority, the parliamentary system, the reintegration of former combatants, decommissioning, and amnesty are combined into a single framework.

But much of the peace process remains unfinished.

  • The MILF’s final phase of decommissioning has not been completed
  • Illegal weapons remain within communities
  • Private armed groups have not been fully dismantled
  • The MNLF remains split into multiple factions
  • The BIFF and other extremist remnants still exist
  • Livelihood and employment support for former combatants is behind schedule
  • Local domination by politicians and powerful clans continues

Whether BARMM succeeds cannot be judged simply by whether former armed-group leaders have taken public office.

What is being tested is whether power can change hands without weapons, whether opposition groups are guaranteed the chance to take part in elections, whether former combatants can rebuild their lives, whether victims of serious crimes are not left behind, and whether the law is enforced equally regardless of political affiliation.

What Four Installments Have Shown

This series examined the following questions by comparing BARMM to an ordinary Philippine local government.

Part 1 covered BARMM’s autonomous powers, fiscal system, tax revenue, natural resources, transfers from the central government, and the possibility of territorial expansion.

Part 2 sorted out police authority, the military, land registration, public and private land, state land, and the currency system.

Part 3 examined unregistered firearms, security companies, the private armies of politicians and clans, vigilante groups, and the legal status of the JPST.

And this fourth part has explained the differences among the MNLF, MILF, BIFF, Abu Sayyaf, and the Maute Group, along with decommissioning, amnesty, and voting/candidacy eligibility.

BARMM is neither an independent country nor a special zone exempt from Philippine law.

At the same time, it holds broader legislative, fiscal, and administrative powers than an ordinary province or municipality, and carries the special role of converting decades of armed conflict into a political system.

BARMM receives an annual block grant and a special development fund from the central government, and has been given strong authority over certain tax revenues and natural-resource income. In that sense, it may hold conditions more favorable for economic development than surrounding areas.

But funding and autonomy alone do not automatically produce development.

Unless BARMM can resolve decommissioning, the rule of law, anti-corruption, administrative capacity, protection of religious and ethnic minorities, fair elections, and the security problems that deter private investment, its institutional advantages will not translate into real development.

BARMM is a large-scale political experiment in which, rather than militarily crushing an anti-government force, the Philippine government sought to bring it into the framework of the state by granting autonomy, fiscal power, a parliament, and elections.

Whether it succeeds will serve as a touchstone not only for the Bangsamoro people, but for the peace and governing capacity of the Philippines as a whole.


※This article is a general explainer based on laws and government materials available as of August 2026. Because armed groups have splintered into multiple factions, the leadership and numbers of remaining forces are subject to change, and figures or names may differ across government statements. Questions of an individual’s amnesty, criminal liability, or eligibility to run for office are determined case by case based on the relevant conviction, amnesty certificate, election law, and other circumstances.

Main References:

From Armed Group to Autonomous Government — How JICA Supports BARMM’s Administration (Part 4 of 4, Final)

From Armed Group to Autonomous Government — How JICA Supports BARMM’s Administration

In March 2014, the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

But signing the peace agreement was not the end of the conflict.

The MILF had operated for decades as an armed group fighting government forces. While it had experience commanding units and negotiating ceasefires, it had limited experience drafting budgets, managing civil servants, or delivering administrative services — roads, education, health, agriculture — to the population.

The ability to run an armed organization is different from the ability to run an autonomous government.

If the new autonomous government took office but the administration failed to function and people’s lives did not improve, disillusionment would spread — the sense that “nothing changed even after laying down arms.” That disillusionment could push former combatants back toward armed groups and shift popular support toward extremists who oppose the peace process.

The role of the Japanese government and JICA also shifted — from supporting the ceasefire and peace negotiations to helping turn the peace agreement into a functioning administration, economy, and society.

The Challenge After Peace Was “Building a Government”

The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro set out the basic policy for establishing a new autonomous government within the Philippine state.

But a peace agreement alone does not make a government run.

Making the new autonomous government function required, at minimum, the following preparations.

  • Design the autonomous government’s organizational structure and ministries
  • Divide authority between the central government and the autonomous government
  • Take over staff, assets, and programs from the former ARMM
  • Establish budgeting, procurement, accounting, and personnel systems
  • Train administrative officials
  • Draft a regional development plan
  • Continue services such as roads, education, health, and agriculture
  • Support the reintegration of former MILF combatants and their families
  • Create new jobs and industries in disarmed areas

What Japan and JICA emphasized here was not constructing office buildings, but cultivating the people who would work in them and the administrative systems they would use.

Preparations for the Autonomous Government Began Back in 2013

Starting in July 2013 — a year before the comprehensive peace agreement was even signed — JICA carried out the “Comprehensive Capacity Development Project for the Bangsamoro.”

At the time, neither the Bangsamoro Organic Law nor the autonomous government’s territory had been finalized.

Japan was investing in institutional design and human resource development at a stage when there was no guarantee the new autonomous government would actually come into being.

The project targeted the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which was preparing the future autonomous government’s institutions, along with administrators from the former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), local government staff, and agriculture/industry stakeholders.

The main areas of support were as follows.

FieldSupport Provided
Organization/InstitutionsAutonomous government structure, administrative systems, transition planning
Human resource developmentTraining for administrators, technical staff, and local leaders
Public servicesAdministrative capacity for water supply, roads, agriculture, etc.
Local industryAgricultural processing, product development, sales
Development planningFormulating the Bangsamoro Development Plan
Regional cooperationCoordination among the autonomous government, local governments, and community organizations

The project continued until 2019 and was later used as the foundation for BARMM’s administrative structure. JICA: “Comprehensive Capacity Development Project for the Bangsamoro”

Why Former ARMM Staff Were Also Included

The new BARMM could not be run by MILF-affiliated personnel alone.

BARMM’s predecessor, the ARMM, already had administrative agencies and staff handling education, health, agriculture, public works, and more.

The ARMM had been criticized for its weak fiscal base, limited administrative capacity, and the influence of powerful local clans. But excluding staff with actual experience delivering services to residents risked halting administration the moment the new government took office.

On the other hand, simply keeping the old ARMM system intact risked producing an autonomous government that was “just the old sign with a new name.”

What was needed was to integrate former ARMM staff’s administrative experience, the MILF’s political legitimacy, and newly recruited specialists into a single government.

Rather than cultivating a single political faction, JICA supported the transition from the old system to the new one.

This is a distinctive feature of Japan’s support.

Drafting the Bangsamoro Development Plan

Alongside building the autonomous government’s organizational structure, JICA supported the formulation of a development plan for the entire Bangsamoro region.

The plan incorporated the fields needed for the region’s economic self-reliance: agriculture, fisheries, roads, ports, electricity, water supply, and local industry.

The Bangsamoro region is rich in agricultural resources, but years of conflict had delayed the development of roads, irrigation, warehouses, ports, and electricity.

Even if farmers produce crops, poor roads keep them from reaching market. Unstable electricity makes it hard to process or refrigerate produce. If ports don’t function well, logistics costs rise for island communities.

Poverty could not be treated as merely an agricultural-technology problem — production, processing, logistics, and sales needed to be improved as a single integrated system.

The development plan JICA supported later became the foundation for selecting concrete projects in roads, electricity, agriculture, and other sectors.

2018: The Bangsamoro Organic Law Is Enacted

It took about five years from the comprehensive peace agreement to the establishment of the autonomous government.

Implementing the peace agreement required the Philippine Congress to enact a law establishing the autonomous government, and residents of the target areas to approve it by referendum.

In July 2018, Republic Act No. 11054, the Bangsamoro Organic Law, was enacted.

A plebiscite was held in January and February 2019, determining BARMM’s establishment and which areas would join.

On February 22 of that year, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority — serving as the provisional autonomous government and interim parliament — was inaugurated.

MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim became the first interim Chief Minister, with former MILF/MNLF members, former ARMM administrators, women, and indigenous representatives joining the interim government.

The stage had begun in which armed group leaders would run the region not with guns, but through administration and parliament.

Not Letting Administration Stop the Moment BARMM Launched

The greatest risk at the launch of the new government was that administrative services would be interrupted during the transition from the old ARMM to BARMM.

While organizational names, staff status, ministry authority, budgets, assets, and contracts were all changing, schools, hospitals, agricultural support, and road maintenance could not simply stop.

So in 2019, JICA launched the “Project for Enhancing the Capacity of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Government.”

The focus of the support was strengthening the interim autonomous government’s administrative management capacity.

  • Organizational and personnel management
  • Staff training systems
  • Surveys of administrative needs
  • Inter-ministerial coordination
  • Policy formulation
  • Agriculture and livelihood improvement
  • Coordination with local governments
  • Response to COVID-19
  • Local industry development

The project was extended beyond its original schedule and ran until March 2026.

Japan’s support shifted from the stage of building the peace agreement to the stage where the government born from that agreement actually delivers public services.

Is Road Construction Peacebuilding?

Roads and bridges occupy an important place in Japan’s Bangsamoro support.

At first glance, road construction looks like a public-works project unrelated to peace.

But in conflict-affected areas, a lack of roads reinforces poverty, the absence of administration, and insecurity, each feeding the others.

Without roads, farmers cannot get their produce to market. Children struggle to reach school, and patients cannot be transported to hospitals. Government staff, police, and medical personnel also find it hard to reach remote areas.

Once roads are built, the following effects can be expected.

  • Lower transport costs for agricultural products
  • Improved access to markets and jobs
  • Easier travel to schools and hospitals
  • Administrative services reaching remote areas
  • Increased interaction between regions
  • Easier evacuation and relief during disasters
  • Armed groups finding it harder to dominate areas without government presence

In 2019, JICA provided a yen loan of about $220.4 million for a road network improvement project in conflict-affected areas.

The project improves and upgrades roughly 100 kilometers of roads in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao, strengthening connections to major cities and arterial roads. JICA: “Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao Road Network Development Project”

Roads not only support residents’ daily lives — they are also the foundation for the BARMM government to actually govern the entire region.

Toward a Government That Can Maintain, Not Just Build

Even if aid builds roads, they deteriorate within a few years without maintenance.

An autonomous government that keeps relying on the central government or foreign aid agencies for repairs cannot really be called self-reliant.

So from 2026 to 2029, JICA will carry out new technical cooperation to strengthen BARMM’s Ministry of Public Works’ capacity to improve and maintain its road network.

The main components are as follows.

  • Formulating a road classification plan
  • Developing a road and bridge database
  • Determining repair priorities
  • Standardizing maintenance operations
  • Pilot projects at local public works offices
  • Building the capacity of Ministry of Public Works staff

This shows JICA’s shift from aid that provides roads directly to aid that builds BARMM’s own capacity to plan and manage roads. JICA–BARMM Road Network Management Capacity Enhancement Project

Support for Marawi’s Reconstruction

In 2017, Marawi — the capital of Lanao del Sur province — was seized by the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf-affiliated forces.

The fighting with the Philippine military lasted about five months, destroying large areas of the city and displacing a large number of residents.

The Battle of Marawi showed that peace with the MILF did not automatically make violence in Mindanao disappear.

Extremists opposed to the peace process recruit members by exploiting weak administration, poverty, youth unemployment, and public discontent.

Japan and JICA provided grant aid of about ¥2 billion — roughly $18.3 million at the time — for road restoration and other work within Marawi city.

Marawi city and its surrounding areas were subsequently included in road network development projects as well.

Road restoration relates not only to urban reconstruction, but also to the return of displaced residents, logistics, administrative services, and preventing extremists from re-infiltrating the area. JICA: “Marawi Recovery Support”

Why Support Agriculture and Livelihoods?

In BARMM, many residents work in agriculture, fishing, and small-scale commerce.

But conflict has left farmland abandoned, destroyed roads and irrigation, and restricted access to markets.

Even after former combatants disarm, without a stable income they risk returning to illegal arms trading, private armies, criminal organizations, or extremist groups.

JICA supported training for autonomous government staff and local agricultural extension workers, rice-farming techniques, agricultural processing, and local industry development.

What matters is not giving former combatants special treatment alone.

If only former combatants receive cash or farming supplies, residents who never took up arms may resent that “those who carried guns come out ahead.”

For that reason, peace support needs to support former combatants, their families, host communities, and residents affected by the conflict together, as one.

Reintegration is not something that ends by handing money to individual combatants. It means creating options for a legal livelihood and employment within the community.

Is JICA Carrying Out the Decommissioning?

The registration and verification of MILF combatants and weapons, and the decommissioning itself, are handled by the Independent Decommissioning Body, established under an agreement between the government and the MILF.

JICA is not the one collecting weapons or detaining combatants.

What the Japanese government and JICA are primarily involved in is creating the socioeconomic conditions that make decommissioning sustainable.

  • Former combatants earning income through farming or business
  • Families gaining access to education and healthcare
  • Roads and water infrastructure being built in host communities
  • The autonomous government delivering administrative services
  • Preventing conflict between communities and former combatants
  • Developing local industry and employment

Handing over a weapon can be done in a day. But the transition from combatant to civilian takes far longer.

Japan’s role lies not in weapons collection itself, but in creating an environment where people no longer need to pick up a weapon to survive.

Decommissioning Is Not Yet Complete

According to the Philippine government, from 2015 through the third phase, roughly 26,000 MILF combatants and 4,625 weapons had been processed for decommissioning.

But the final, fourth phase has not been completed.

The government had targeted 14,000 combatants and 2,450 weapons for the final phase, but the MILF postponed it, arguing the government had not sufficiently fulfilled its obligations — such as socioeconomic support for already-decommissioned combatants.

This issue shows that development assistance and decommissioning cannot be separated.

The government side holds that weapons should be surrendered first; the MILF side argues that the promised livelihood support should come first.

JICA’s agriculture, livelihood, road, and administrative support can help bridge this distrust. But Japan cannot fulfill the agreement between the government and the MILF on their behalf.

The Results of Japan’s Support

Over more than 20 years, the support of the Japanese government and JICA has produced certain results.

  • Delivered a peace dividend to residents
  • Earned trust from both the government and the MILF
  • Supported the Narita talks and peace negotiations from the sidelines
  • Developed administrative personnel even before the autonomous government was established
  • Supported the formulation of the Bangsamoro Development Plan
  • Helped prevent an administrative gap at BARMM’s launch
  • Improved basic conditions such as agriculture, roads, and water supply
  • Contributed to Marawi’s reconstruction
  • Linked former combatants’ reintegration with regional development
  • Is building BARMM’s own capacity to manage infrastructure

This was not simply about providing funds — it was a long-term investment in people, institutions, and communities.

The Limits of Japan’s Support

On the other hand, there are many problems Japanese ODA alone cannot solve.

Delayed Decommissioning

The MILF’s final phase of decommissioning has not been completed, and illegal weapons remain in the region.

Private Armies and Clan Politics

The private armed groups of local politicians and powerful clans, and inter-clan feuds, cannot be resolved immediately through administrative support alone.

Corruption and Administrative Capacity

Gaps exist between the autonomous government’s ministries in staffing, expertise, and budget execution capacity. If foreign aid increases but procurement, auditing, and information disclosure remain inadequate, public trust will be lost.

Regional Disparities

Maguindanao, Lanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and other areas differ in geography, security, and industrial structure. Attention is also needed to the gap between areas with extensive road development and island communities where aid is harder to reach.

A Prolonged Political Transition

BARMM’s interim governance has been prolonged. The transition from an interim period in which peace-process leaders run the administration, to normal politics in which residents elect their government and power can change hands, is essential.

Aid Dependence

Continued reliance on the central government or foreign aid would prevent BARMM from developing its own capacity for taxation, planning, and maintenance.

Whether Japan’s support has succeeded cannot be judged solely by the number of roads built or training sessions held.

The ultimate benchmark is whether, after the aid ends, BARMM can deliver administrative services on its own, maintain its facilities, and earn the trust of its residents.

Did Japan “Build the Bangsamoro Government”?

The parties that built BARMM were the Philippine government, the MILF, the MNLF, the Philippine Congress, and the residents who took part in the plebiscite.

Japan did not design the autonomous government or impose it from outside.

The role of the Japanese government and JICA was to provide funding, technology, human resource development, and a diplomatic venue so the parties themselves could carry out the peace and autonomy they had chosen.

This position matters.

If a foreign aid agency decides an autonomous government’s policies on its behalf, administrative capacity never develops. Conversely, simply handing over funds without checking results can invite corruption, inefficiency, and political bias.

JICA has taken the approach of respecting BARMM’s own ownership while jointly advancing planning, training, pilot projects, and institution-building.

Japan’s role is not to be the protagonist of peace, but to support the parties to peace until they can run their own government.

What Four Installments Have Shown

Part 1 covered why Japan took part in reconstruction support after the 1996 MNLF peace agreement, and why it began full-scale support for Mindanao in 2001–2002.

Part 2 examined how J-BIRD (the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development) began in 2006, and how Japan sent development experts rather than soldiers to the international monitoring team.

Part 3 showed how Japan’s development assistance grew into diplomatic mediating capacity, through its participation in the International Contact Group in 2009, the 2011 Narita talks, the 2012 Framework Agreement, and the 2014 comprehensive peace agreement.

This final installment has laid out how Japan supported the training of administrators, development planning, roads, agriculture, livelihoods, and the reintegration of former combatants, in order to turn the peace agreement into a functioning autonomous government.

This engagement of more than 20 years can be summed up in three stages.

  1. Sustaining the ceasefire
  2. Bringing the political agreement to fruition
  3. Making the post-peace government and society function

Japan was involved in all three stages, each in a different way.

Conclusion — Not Just Stopping the Fighting, but Reducing the Reasons to Return to It

Military peacekeeping monitors so that armed factions do not resume fighting.

But simply monitoring a ceasefire line does not resolve land disputes, poverty, unemployment, the absence of administration, lack of education, or public distrust.

What the Japanese government and JICA aimed for was not imposing peace by force.

Build schools, health centers, wells, and roads. Raise farmers’ incomes. Enable former combatants to live as civilians. Train administrators, and enable the autonomous government to deliver services to residents.

And support the institutions through which political demands can be realized through parliament, elections, and administration, rather than guns.

Japan’s Bangsamoro support is neither ordinary ODA nor conventional ceasefire monitoring.

It was peacebuilding that, without using military force, reduced the reasons to return to fighting, one by one.

What ultimately matters is not the amount of Japanese aid or the number of facilities built.

It is whether BARMM’s residents come to trust their autonomous government rather than armed groups, and whether a society takes root in which political change comes through elections rather than guns.


※This article is based on materials available as of August 2026 from the Japanese government, JICA, the Philippine government, and other sources. Foreign-currency conversions for road-project costs, etc., are based on figures at the time of announcement.

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