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MANILA NEWS DAILY

August 8, 2026 (Saturday) Edition
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Nostalgic Photos

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (14th President, 2001–2010) and Senator Loren Legarda, pictured together in their old school uniforms. Both women graduated from Assumption High School in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City, the school known for this particular uniform. This is not a composite image — it was obtained by requesting it directly from the Presidential Palace at the time, “for use in introducing the administration.”
Loren is a bit of a stretch in it, but President Arroyo, perhaps owing to her petite proportions, actually pulls it off rather well, don’t you think? Incidentally, Gloria’s father was President Diosdado Macapagal (9th President, 1957–1961), celebrated as the “president of the common man” and himself a tall, handsome president.

The next photo is of:

This shows key members of the Arroyo cabinet at the time, dressed up as characters from the movie Men in Black. Secretary of National Defense Reyes (far left), a man I greatly admired, would later meet a tragic end by taking his own life with a gunshot at Manila Memorial Park — but that is a story for another time. These photos were taken for a feature in Philippine Tatler magazine, back when the administration was at the height of its influence.

Why Did Japan Engage in the Bangsamoro Peace Process? — From the MNLF Peace Agreement to the Launch of J-BIRD (Part 1)

Why Did Japan Engage in the Bangsamoro Peace Process? — From the MNLF Peace Agreement to the Launch of J-BIRD (Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development)

Why did the Japanese government come to be so deeply involved in the Mindanao conflict, which lasted more than 40 years in the southern Philippines?

Japan was not a party to the fighting between the Philippine government and the rebel groups. It had no treaty obligation to defend the Philippines, nor did it deploy its Self-Defense Forces to Mindanao to suppress armed groups.

And yet, the Japanese government and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) entered the conflict zone even before peace negotiations were complete, building schools, health centers, wells, and farm roads. They also made contact with both the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and later became involved in ceasefire monitoring and the peace negotiations themselves.

Behind this lay not only humanitarian concern but also Japan’s national interests: stability in Southeast Asia, diplomatic relations with the Philippines, Japan’s sea lanes, and preventing the spread of Islamist extremism.

The method Japan chose was not military intervention, but “human security” — reducing the reasons people return to conflict through development assistance.

What Was the Bangsamoro Conflict?

Bangsamoro refers to the historical and political community centered on the Muslim population of the southern Philippines.

In western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, Islamic political communities such as the Sultanate of Sulu and the Sultanate of Maguindanao existed even before Spanish colonial rule of the Philippines.

However, from the period of American colonial rule through the years after Philippine independence, the land system and population composition changed dramatically.

As Christian settlers migrated from Luzon, the Visayas, and elsewhere, Moro residents and indigenous peoples who could not adapt fully to the modern land registration system lost the land they had traditionally used.

Compounded by political marginalization, poverty, religious and cultural conflict, and human rights abuses by government troops and militias, the Moro nationalist movement escalated into armed struggle from the late 1960s.

The first large-scale armed organization was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), led by Nur Misuari.

The MILF later split off from the MNLF and continued fighting the Philippine government. The conflict is estimated to have killed roughly 150,000 to 160,000 people and displaced a cumulative total of more than two million.

Japan’s Involvement Began After the MNLF Peace Agreement

The first opportunity for the Japanese government and JICA to become involved in the Mindanao peace process came with the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF.

Under this agreement, the mainstream MNLF shifted from armed struggle to political participation and took part in governing the former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Japan was one of the countries that supported post-agreement reconstruction and regional development at an early stage.

The 1996 agreement, however, did not end the Mindanao conflict as a whole.

The MILF, having split from the MNLF, continued its armed struggle against the government. Supporting peace with the MNLF alone would not bring peace to the region as a whole if fighting with the MILF continued.

The Japanese government gradually came to believe that supporting reconstruction only after a peace agreement was concluded was not enough, and that it needed to engage in regional development even while peace negotiations were still ongoing.

Timeline to the Start of Japan’s Involvement

  • 1996 — Government and MNLF sign the Final Peace Agreement / Japan joins reconstruction and development assistance
  • 1997–2000 — Fighting with the MILF continues / Japan surveys Mindanao’s poverty and conflict structure
  • 2000 — The Estrada administration launches a major offensive on MILF strongholds / The limits of a military solution become clear
  • 2001 — The Arroyo administration and the MILF resume peace talks / Japan introduces the “Mindanao Support Package”
  • 2002 — Peace talks proceed under a ceasefire / JICA begins full-scale peace and development support
  • 2003 — After clashes between the military and the MILF, the ceasefire is rebuilt / Japan emphasizes continuity across humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aid
  • 2004 — The International Monitoring Team (IMT) is established / Japan considers joining the ceasefire monitoring effort
  • 2006 — The international framework for peace support expands / Japan launches J-BIRD and sends development experts to the IMT

Support from the Japanese government and JICA began incrementally in 1996, intensified in 2001–02, and by 2006 had grown into comprehensive peace support combining diplomacy and development.

Why Did Japan Get Involved in a Domestic Philippine Conflict?

To Prevent Instability Across Southeast Asia

The Japanese government has explained that peace and stability in Mindanao are essential not only for the Philippines but for the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago sit in the waters linking the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Weak governance in a conflict zone makes cross-border movement of weapons, personnel, illegal drugs, and contraband easier. It also raises the risk that kidnapping gangs and extremists can operate by moving between the islands.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, attention has also grown on the links between Islamist extremists active in Southeast Asia and international terrorist organizations.

For Japan too, the waters around the Philippines are a vital sea lane supporting trade and energy shipments.

Instability in Mindanao also affects ASEAN’s economic growth, Japanese corporate investment, maritime logistics, and the safety of Japanese nationals.

Japan’s involvement in the Bangsamoro peace process therefore also had the aim of protecting Japan’s own security and economic interests through regional stability.

Because the Philippines Was an Important Diplomatic and Economic Partner for Japan

Japan and the Philippines share the grave history of the Japanese military’s occupation during World War II.

After the war, Japan rebuilt its relationship with the Philippines through reparations, economic cooperation, and official development assistance.

Japan went on to become one of the Philippines’ largest ODA donors, supporting the development of roads, railways, ports, electricity, and water systems over a long period.

To the Philippine government, Japan came to be seen not as a country that projects military power, but as one that continuously supports administration and infrastructure development.

Japan’s involvement in the Mindanao peace process was an extension of this long-standing Japan-Philippines relationship.

It was precisely because of this trust with the Philippine government that Japanese experts were permitted to enter a conflict zone with unstable security and make contact with the MILF side.

Sadako Ogata and “Human Security”

One figure essential to understanding Japan’s engagement with Bangsamoro is Sadako Ogata, who served as JICA’s president from 2003 to 2012.

Drawing on her experience as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ogata placed importance on “human security” — protecting each individual person, not just the state, from threats such as conflict, poverty, disease, and disaster.

Traditional security thinking centers on borders, territory, government, and the military.

But for the people of Mindanao, security meant more than that.

Even if the fighting stopped, life would not be stable without schools to attend, drinking water, roads to carry crops to market, or roads to reach a hospital.

Young people and former combatants who lost their livelihoods and could not sustain themselves risked rejoining armed groups.

Ogata’s approach was not to “begin development once a ceasefire is reached,” but to improve residents’ lives even during peace negotiations and build the social foundation that sustains peace.

In 2006, according to JICA records, Ogata told both the Philippine government and the MILF leadership that “development has a role to play in achieving peace in Mindanao.” JICA, “Peace and Development in Mindanao”

“Aid After Peace Is Reached” Comes Too Late

Ordinary reconstruction aid normally begins after a war or conflict has ended.

But the approach Japan took in Mindanao was different.

Even before a final peace agreement existed between the government and the MILF, Japan carried out the following projects in conflict-affected areas:

  • School construction and repair
  • Health center development
  • Wells and water-supply installation
  • Farm roads, minor roads, and bridge development
  • Agricultural technical support, including rice farming
  • Training for local governments and community leaders
  • Participatory community development

This assistance had two purposes.

The first was to improve the lives of residents affected by the fighting.

The second was to give residents concrete proof that “life improves as peace progresses,” building support for the peace process.

The Japanese government thought of this as a “peace dividend.”

Even if peace negotiators draft an agreement, support for peace remains weak if ordinary residents feel no benefit from it. Conversely, once schools, wells, roads, and health centers are completed, residents can see that the ceasefire is relevant to their own lives.

Development assistance thus became a mechanism that supported the peace negotiations from below.

Why Was Japan Also Accepted by the MILF?

For JICA to operate in the conflict zone, it needed not only the Philippine government’s cooperation but also the understanding and security cooperation of the MILF.

The following factors are thought to explain why Japan earned a degree of trust from the MILF side:

  • Japan was not a direct party to the fighting in the Moro conflict
  • Japan did not get involved with the aim of militarily defeating the MILF
  • Japan’s assistance covered Christians and indigenous peoples as well as Muslims
  • Japan showed it was not siding solely with the government or the MILF
  • Japan carried out projects, however small, that residents could use directly
  • Japan continued its support over a long period

Japan did not recognize the MILF as the representative of an independent state.

At the same time, it did not dismiss the MILF as a mere criminal organization either, engaging with it instead as a party to the peace negotiations and a political organization with the potential to lead a future autonomous government.

Maintaining this delicate position was a distinctive feature of Japan’s approach.

Japan’s Wartime Responsibility Must Not Be Forgotten

In explaining Japan’s support for the Philippines, simplistic claims such as “Japan was trusted because it never colonized Asia” should not be used.

The Japanese military occupied the Philippines during World War II, and large numbers of civilians were killed in Manila and elsewhere. Mindanao was no exception.

Japan’s trust with the Philippines, therefore, did not exist from the start — it was rebuilt after the war through reparations, diplomacy, ODA, and people-to-people exchange.

For the Japanese government, cooperation with the Philippines was also part of improving relations with Southeast Asia and of its postwar diplomacy.

Support for Bangsamoro was not built by ignoring the past relationship between Japan and the Philippines — it was cooperation built over a long period on top of that history.

The 2001 Mindanao Support Package

In 2001, when peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF resumed, the Japanese government introduced the “Mindanao Support Package.”

This marked a shift in which Japan began treating the Mindanao peace process as a whole, not just individual reconstruction projects, as a subject of its ODA policy.

From 2002, JICA also began in earnest to provide support with peace and development as explicit goals.

At this point, today’s BARMM did not yet exist. The old ARMM’s administrative capacity was weak, and there was no guarantee that peace between the government and the MILF would succeed.

Japan did not join in only after the outcome was assured.

It began its long-term involvement at a stage when peace still risked collapsing again.

2006: J-BIRD Begins

2006 was the year Japan’s involvement changed significantly.

That year, the Japanese government launched the “Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development,” known by its acronym J-BIRD.

J-BIRD is a comprehensive framework bringing together the Japanese government and JICA’s projects to support peace and development in the Bangsamoro region.

It rested on three main pillars:

  • Regional development — schools, health centers, water supply facilities, roads, and more
  • Human resource development — training for local government officials, agricultural workers, and community leaders
  • Poverty reduction — improving agriculture, livelihoods, and local industry

At the same time, Japan dispatched experts in socioeconomic development to the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which monitored the ceasefire between the Philippine government and the MILF.

Through this, Japan moved from being merely a funding country to a participating country supporting peace on the ground in the ceasefire zone.

Rather than carrying weapons to stop the fighting, JICA experts surveyed needs in the conflict zone and connected residents, local government, the Philippine national government, and the MILF.

This marked the true beginning of Japan’s “unarmed peacekeeping.”

Do Japan’s National Interest and Humanitarian Aid Conflict?

Japan’s support for Bangsamoro cannot be explained by pure goodwill alone.

Japan had national interests at stake: strengthening ties with the Philippines, ASEAN stability, counterterrorism, the security of its sea lanes, and the investment environment for Japanese companies.

But the presence of national interest does not negate the value of the assistance as humanitarian aid.

What matters is that Japan sought to advance its own interests not through military expansion, but through improving local residents’ lives, supporting peace negotiations, and building administrative capacity.

If the people of Mindanao can live safely, the regional economy develops, and political demands can be voiced in parliament rather than through weapons, it benefits the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and Japan alike.

This was a diplomacy that sought to align Japan’s interests with those of the Bangsamoro people.

Conclusion of Part 1

There is no single reason why the Japanese government came to engage with Bangsamoro.

  • Conflict with the MILF continued even after the 1996 MNLF peace agreement
  • Military force alone could not resolve the conflict
  • Poverty and a lack of public services sustained the armed struggle
  • Instability in Mindanao affected Southeast Asia as a whole
  • The Philippines was an important diplomatic and economic partner for Japan
  • Japan incorporated human security into its ODA policy
  • Development assistance could be used as Japan’s own distinctive tool for peacebuilding

Japan did not choose to be a country that merely provided reconstruction funds after a peace agreement was completed.

It entered the ground even at a stage when negotiations might still fail, improving residents’ lives and building trust with both the government and the MILF.

That accumulated effort led to the launch of J-BIRD and participation in the International Monitoring Team in 2006.


Coming in Part 2

Part 2 will examine why Japan sent development experts, rather than military personnel, to the International Monitoring Team.

What were JICA experts doing in the conflict zone? Why does building schools, wells, health centers, and farm roads help sustain a ceasefire? And why did Japan not withdraw even after the 2008 collapse of peace talks and the resumption of fighting?

Part 2 will focus on J-BIRD and the “peace dividend” to examine Japan’s unarmed support for the ceasefire.

*This article is based on materials from the Japanese government, JICA, the Philippine government, and other sources available as of August 2026.

Main Sources

What Is the Bangsamoro Autonomous Government? — How It Differs from an Ordinary Philippine Local Government (Part 1 of 4)

What Is the Bangsamoro Autonomous Government? — How It Differs from an Ordinary Philippine Local Government

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in the southern Philippines — formally the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) — has a political system and fiscal powers that differ from those of an ordinary province, city, or municipality.

It has its own parliament, chief minister, executive ministries, and revenue system. It receives the majority of national taxes collected within the region, and it also receives an annual block grant from the national government.

So is BARMM effectively a “state within a state” inside the Philippines?

The short answer is no.

BARMM has broad autonomy, but it is neither a state independent of the Republic of the Philippines nor a federal member-state on equal footing with the national government. Sovereign powers — foreign affairs, national defense, currency, citizenship, and immigration control — remain with the national government.

In this first installment, we examine how BARMM differs from an ordinary local government, whether the “75% of national taxes” figure is accurate, whether it can also receive grants from the national government, and whether it has an economic development advantage over neighboring regions.

BARMM Is Part of the Republic of the Philippines

BARMM was established under Republic Act No. 11054, enacted in 2018 and commonly known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law.

The law explicitly states that BARMM is “an inseparable and indivisible part of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines.”

The Philippine Constitution and national laws therefore apply in BARMM. Regional laws enacted by the Bangsamoro Parliament also cannot conflict with the Constitution or laws passed by Congress.

At the same time, BARMM is granted far greater autonomy than an ordinary local government.

The main differences are as follows:

  • It has a parliamentary-style autonomous government
  • The Bangsamoro Parliament elects the Chief Minister
  • It can establish executive ministries that ordinary local governments do not have
  • It has its own budget and revenue system
  • It can levy and collect certain taxes within the region
  • It has special authority over natural resource management and revenue sharing
  • A Shari’ah justice system is recognized within a defined scope
  • It maintains an intergovernmental coordination body with the national government
  • It has a peace mechanism covering the decommissioning and reintegration of former combatants

An ordinary provincial governor is never chosen by the provincial council. In BARMM, however, the Bangsamoro Parliament elects the Chief Minister from among its members, and the Chief Minister then appoints the ministers who head each ministry.

In this respect, it resembles the parliamentary systems of countries such as the United Kingdom or Japan more than it does the Philippines’ own presidential system.

The Bangsamoro Parliament and the Philippine Congress Are Separate Bodies

The Bangsamoro Parliament is not a regional branch of the Philippine Congress.

The Philippine Congress is the national legislature, made up of the Senate and House of Representatives. The Bangsamoro Parliament, by contrast, is a legislature that enacts regional laws within the scope of BARMM’s autonomy.

Residents of BARMM vote in elections for the Philippine president, senators, House representatives, and local government leaders. On top of that, they also vote in Bangsamoro Parliament elections.

In other words, BARMM residents take part in national politics as Filipino citizens while also participating in the politics of their autonomous region.

As of August 2026, BARMM remains in a transition period, with the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) serving as both interim parliament and interim government. The first regular parliamentary election is scheduled for September 14, 2026.

Is It True That “BARMM Keeps 75% of National Taxes”?

Broadly, yes. But under the law, the current transition period actually works even more favorably for BARMM.

Article 12, Section 10 of the Bangsamoro Organic Law provides that, in principle, national taxes, fees, and charges collected by the national government within BARMM — excluding tariffs and import-related taxes — are shared as follows:

  • BARMM side — 75%
  • National government — 25%

This 75% share for the BARMM side includes not only the BARMM government itself but also the shares of its constituent provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.

There is, however, an important exception.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law provides that, for the first ten years after the law took effect, even the national government’s 25% share also goes to the BARMM side.

During this exception period, then, effectively 100% of covered national taxes collected within BARMM — excluding tariffs and import-related taxes — go to the BARMM side.

After the ten years end, the split reverts to the baseline 75% for BARMM and 25% for the national government. However, the national government retains room to extend the exception period at BARMM’s request.

It is worth noting that this does not mean residents and businesses are exempt from paying national taxes.

Residents and businesses pay taxes under national law as usual. It is the amount collected that is then shared between the national government and the BARMM side according to the ratios set by law.

Nor can the BARMM government freely change income tax, VAT, tariffs, or excise taxes. BARMM’s taxing power is constrained by the Constitution and the national tax system.

Republic Act No. 11054 — the Bangsamoro Organic Law

BARMM Also Receives a Block Grant, Separate from Its Share of National Taxes

Separate from its share of national taxes collected within the region, BARMM also receives an Annual Block Grant from the national government.

This point is important for understanding BARMM’s fiscal system.

It is not a trade-off in which the region gives up national government transfers in exchange for keeping 75% of national taxes.

The two are separate sources of funding.

The base amount of the Annual Block Grant is calculated from the net national internal revenue collections and net Bureau of Customs collections for the whole Philippines, set at the equivalent of 5% of that total.

This funding has the following characteristics:

  • It is automatically appropriated in Congress’s General Appropriations Act
  • It is released to the BARMM government without waiting for separate additional approval
  • The national government cannot, in principle, unilaterally withhold or suspend it
  • The specific allocation is decided by the Bangsamoro Parliament’s own appropriations law
  • Education, health, and social welfare are designated priority sectors
  • The block grant cannot be used to purchase firearms, ammunition, weapons, or explosives

Unspent amounts, too, are not, in principle, returned to the national government — they can instead be moved into a special fund within Bangsamoro’s treasury and reallocated in later years.

This degree of flexibility is a major difference from ordinary national-agency budgets or purpose-specific subsidies.

A Special Development Fund Also Exists

In addition to the national tax share and the Annual Block Grant, BARMM also has a Special Development Fund.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law provides for a total of 50 billion pesos, disbursed at 5 billion pesos per year over ten years, for BARMM’s rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development.

This reflects the fact that decades of armed conflict meant:

  • Roads and bridges went undeveloped
  • Schools and hospitals were in short supply
  • Residents were repeatedly displaced
  • Investment in agriculture and business stagnated
  • Job opportunities for former combatants were scarce

These are the historical disparities the fund is meant to narrow.

In addition, national projects carried out by national government agencies, assistance from foreign governments and international organizations, official development assistance, and peace-related funds are also used within BARMM.

BARMM’s funding, in other words, comes from more than one source.

  • BARMM’s own revenue — regional taxes, fees, business income, and the like
  • Regional share of national taxes — 75% in principle; for the first ten years, the national government’s 25% share also goes to BARMM
  • Annual Block Grant — a comprehensive transfer calculated from nationwide tax revenue
  • Special Development Fund — 50 billion pesos in total for rehabilitation and development
  • Natural resource revenue — special revenue-sharing depending on the type of resource
  • National agency projects — nationwide projects in roads, ports, education, healthcare, and more
  • International aid / ODA — reconstruction, peacebuilding, infrastructure, social development, and more

Not All Natural Resource Revenue Follows the 75% Rule

Some explanations claim “BARMM receives 75% of natural resource revenue,” but the 75% split for national taxes and the revenue-sharing arrangement for natural resources are separate systems, and treatment differs depending on the type of resource.

For petroleum, natural gas, coal, and uranium in particular, there is a provision for joint management by the national government and the BARMM government, with revenue shared in principle on an equal basis.

It is therefore inaccurate to assume that “BARMM 75%, national government 25%” applies uniformly to all natural resource revenue.

The 75% share of national taxes, the sharing of natural resource revenue, and the Annual Block Grant each need to be understood as distinct systems.

Does BARMM Have an Economic Development Advantage Over Neighboring Provinces?

Institutionally, it can be.

BARMM has access to all of the following:

  • A large share of national taxes
  • The Annual Block Grant
  • The Special Development Fund
  • Natural resource revenue
  • National government projects
  • International aid
  • Peace and reintegration-related funding

and it can use them all at the same time.

Compared with an ordinary local government, the regional government also has much greater latitude to set its own policy priorities.

If it invests appropriately in education, healthcare, agriculture, industrial promotion, and road development, it has the potential to develop faster than neighboring regions.

But an abundance of funding does not automatically translate into economic growth.

BARMM still faces:

  • Illegal firearms
  • Private armies of politicians and clans
  • Clan feuds (rido)
  • Regional dominance by political dynasties
  • Unclear land tenure
  • Limited administrative capacity
  • The risk of corruption
  • Shortfalls in roads, ports, electricity, and communications

If the budget is spent on public services and productive infrastructure, this fiscal advantage can translate into economic development. But if it flows instead into patronage for political clans, ineffective projects, or corruption, abundant funding will not improve residents’ lives.

A more precise assessment, then, would be:

BARMM has a more favorable fiscal system than its neighboring provinces. But whether that favorable system translates into real economic development depends on security, administrative capacity, transparency, land issues, and safeguards against corruption.

Can Neighboring Areas Join BARMM in the Future?

Even if a neighboring province or municipality wishes to join BARMM, the BARMM government and Bangsamoro Parliament alone cannot approve its admission.

The 2019 plebiscite held under the Bangsamoro Organic Law set up a mechanism under which an adjacent area could take part in a vote on joining BARMM, based on either a resolution of its local council or a petition signed by at least 10% of its registered voters.

This, however, was a provision specific to the plebiscite that established BARMM.

Incorporating new provinces or municipalities into BARMM in the future would, in principle, require:

  • New legislation or an amendment to the Organic Law by the Philippine Congress
  • Defining the area to be covered
  • A plebiscite as required under the Constitution
  • Approval by the residents of the areas concerned

It is therefore politically possible for Sulu or other neighboring provinces to seek to join BARMM in the future, but this cannot be achieved through agreement with the BARMM government alone.

Ultimately, it would require legislation by the Philippine Congress and a plebiscite.

What Determines the Success of Autonomy Is How the Budget Is Used

BARMM holds legislative and fiscal powers far beyond those of an ordinary Philippine local government.

In particular:

  • A large share of national taxes collected within the region
  • The Annual Block Grant from the national government
  • The Special Development Fund
  • Participation in natural resource management
  • Its own budget-making authority

these are important institutional pillars supporting BARMM’s economic development.

At the same time, the very fact that it can allocate its budget at some distance from national government oversight places a heavy burden of accountability on the BARMM government itself.

It is not enough to look only at the scope of its autonomy — it is necessary to continually verify whether that authority is actually improving residents’ education, healthcare, employment, agriculture, transportation, and public safety.

What determines BARMM’s success is not simply “how much funding it has obtained from the national government.”

It is who uses that funding, through what process, for what purpose, and what results it delivers for residents.


Coming in Part 2:

Part 2 will examine BARMM’s police force, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, land titling, public land, and currency.

Does BARMM have its own police force or military? Does state-owned land within the region belong to the BARMM government? And is the Malaysian ringgit, used in Tawi-Tawi, legal tender? We sort out the answers.

*This article is based on laws and government materials available as of August 2026.

Main Sources:

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